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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (2000). 
STATEMENT OF TTHE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEEW 
1. Are the Court's findings of Fact with Respect to Historical Existence and 
use of the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road clearly erroneous? This issue 
was raised and preserved below in Defendants written closing argument 
and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Standard of Review: The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact 
are clearly erroneous is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 
1992). "The clearly erroneous standard 'requires that if the findings . . . are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, jf the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has Ibeen made, the findings will be set aside.'" State v. C.A., 
995 P.2d 17 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting In Re J.N., 960 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah App. 
1998)). "In addition, a party (Challenging the court's findings must marshal the evidence 
in support of those findings, qnd then show that the marshaled evidence is insufficient, 
as a matter of law, to supportjthe findings." Id. (citing In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d 943, 947 
(Utah App. 1998)). 
2. Is the trial court'[s finding that there was not a ten-year period of 
uninterrupted u$e clearly erroneous? This issue was raised and 
preserved below in Defendants written closing argument and proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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Standard of Review: The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact are 
clearly erroneous is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). "The 
clearly erroneous standard 'requires that if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made, the findings will be set aside.'" State v. C.A., 995 P.2d 17 (Utah 
App. 1998) (quoting In Re J.A/., 960 P.2d 403,407 (Utah App. 1998)). "In addition, a party 
challenging the court's findings must marshal the evidence in support of those findings, 
and then show that the marshaled evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support 
the findings." Id. (citing In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah App. 1998)). 
3. Are the trial court's conclusions supported by the findings of fact and/or are 
the conclusions correct? This issue was raised and preserved below in 
Defendants written closing argument proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
Standard of Review: The question of whether a trial court's findings of fact are 
sufficient to support its conclusions of law is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 
1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 
1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991). Additionally, conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
4. Did the trial court err in finding that there was not an uninterrupted ten year 
period of use of the road bv the public prior to plaintiffs' permanent blocking 
2 
thereof? This is^ue was raised and preserved below in Defendants written 
closing argument and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Standard of Review: The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact are 
clearly erroneous is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State v. Pens, 
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). "The 
clearly erroneous standard 'requires that if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made, the findings will be set aside.'" State v. C.A, 995 P.2d 17 (Utah 
App. 1998) (quoting In Re J.Ni 960 P.2d 403,407 (Utah App. 1998)). "In addition, a party 
challenging the court's findings must marshal the evidence in support of those findings, 
and then show that the marshaled evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support 
the findings." Id. (citing In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah App. 1998)). 
Are the trial court's findings of fact sufficient to support its conclusion of law 5. 
sufficiently detai ed to support its ultimate decision that there was a legally 
sufficient blocking of the road and that the road was not a public 
thoroughfare? this was raised and preserved below in Defendants written 
closing argument and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Standard of Review: The question of whether a trial court's findings of fact are 
sufficient to support its conclusions of law is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 
1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 
1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991). Additionally, conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
6. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in concluding that there was not a 
ten-year uninterrupted period of use of the road and that the road was 
therefore not a public thoroughfare? This issue was raised and preserved 
below in Defendants written closing argument and proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
Standard of Review: This presents a question of law that should be reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). 
7. Did the trial court err by failing to consider all evidence pertaining to the 
existence of a public thoroughfare including evidence prior, during and/or 
after the warranty deeds were executed by defendant? This issue was 
raised and preserved below in Defendants written closing argument and 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and objection to 
Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment. 
Standard of Review: This presents a question of law that should be reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). 
8. Did the court err in concluding that the statute of limitations had not expired 
and the court could rely upon the warranty deed to prevent defendant from 
asserting the public thoroughfare doctrine? This issue was raised and 
preserved below in Defendants written closing argument and proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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Standard of Review: jThis presents a question of law that should be reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., State ty. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. 72-5-104 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 (2000) 
There are no Constitutional Provisions for the State of Utah or the United States. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Defendant Pinel 
mountain property subdivided 
the property in several differen 
View Meadow Estates respectfully begs this Court's 
indulgence in using this section to try and give this Court both a flavor as well as the nature 
of this case. Defendant respectfully urges this Court to keep several important facts in 
mind as it reviews this case. P ne View Meadow Estates is a subdivision developer of high 
for the purpose of recreational living. Defendant developed 
: plat phases, although some of the phases were intertwined 
as the development proceeded. The plat upon which Plaintiff purchased two (2) lots 
(hereinafter "the lots") is in a subdivision titled Strawberry Valley Subdivision. Strawberry 
to a second subdivision which was being developed 
simultaneously with Strawberry Valley. This subdivision is identified as Ihe Ponderosa 
Villa. Plaintiff purchased the lots almost two (2) years after Defendant commenced 
construction and development of both Subdivisions. 
Valley is located adjacent 
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In order to develop Ponderosa Villa, (the upper elevated subdivision), it was initially 
necessary to grade a road from Strawberry Valley, (the lower elevated subdivision), to 
Ponderosa Villa. The first constructed road, known as Valley View Drive and referred in 
the case as the Wilhelm Road, is the bases of this dispute. The road commences from 
Bonanza Circle and traverses up and across lots 38 and 39 of Strawberry Valley to 
Ponderosa Villa. A second road was constructed a short time later and was also 
constructed at the time Plaintiff purchased lots 38 and 39. 
Plaintiff purchased lots 38 and 39 in Strawberry Valley in early summer of 1968 and 
made payments on the lots for several years prior to actually being issued warranty deeds, 
and was well aware, at the time the deeds were issued, that people were utilizing Valley 
View Drive/Wilhelm Road to access their properties in Ponderosa Villa or to access 
adjacent forest land. Governmental agencies utilized Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on 
a regular basis to service fire protection for neighboring areas and it was testified by many 
that hunters, strangers, guests, sight-seers, and every form of public utilized Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road during the roads existence. 
This is a case wherewith Plaintiff is attempting to close and blockade Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road which has been open and available for use by the public for over thirty 
(30) years. Plaintiff's claim of right to close Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road is based upon 
a Warranty Deed executed by Defendant Pine View Meadows Estates in the early 1970's 
which failed to identify and describe the roadway easement. Plaintiff also claims a right 
of closure because of three alleged brief and temporary road blocks in the years 1973, 
1980 and 1986. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that when Garkane Power trenched an 
underground power line across the road during the years of 1973-74, through use of an 
6 
independent contractor, Plaintiff may rely on the trench as an effective blockage of the 
road; in 1980, Plaintiff alleges }hat he blocked the road for a weekend with the use of a car 
parked horizontally across the) road; and in 1986 by felling a tree across the road which 
was removed by unknown persons for firewood. Defendant asserts that the road has been 
open to the public for over thirty years and should thus be deemed a public road. 
Defendant asserts further that all three of the road blocks were insufficient based on the 
nature of blocking and lack of (notice to the public. 
Plaintiff initially instituted this action demanding actual damages, punitive damages, 
attorney fees and closure of Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. The only matter before this 
Court on appeal is the trial court's order that Plaintiff be permitted to close Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road. Defendant asserts that Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road has been 
open to the public for more than thirty (30) years and that by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §75-
2-104, (1953 as amended), Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road has been abandoned and 
deemed a public road, and Plaintiff has no authority to block or close Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road and prevent its use by the general public. 
Course of the Proceedings 
On or about June 25, 1997, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants 
alleging a breach of warranty! under the deed executed by Defendants to Plaintiffs and 
requesting damages and judgment against Defendants. Defendants filed their Answer and 
Counterclaim on or about August 6, 1997 alleging that no breach of the warranty deed 
occurred and that Plaintiffs had knowledge of the disputed roadway and had agreed to 
keep the same open to the pijblic. 
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On or about March 24, 1998, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint to add an additional cause of action requesting closure of the roadway in 
dispute. On or about May 28, 1998, said Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was 
granted by the Court. Plaintiffs' Amended their Complaint and Defendants answered the 
same on or about April 29, 1998. On or about July 8, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Defendants filed a counter Motion for Summary Judgment on or 
about July 28, 1998. On or about March 8, 1999, the Trial Court issued its Ruling on 
Motions for Summary Judgment partly denying both Motions and permitting the matter to 
proceed to trial. The Trial Court did find that all evidence regarding the existence of a 
public roadway prior to the issuance of the Warranty Deeds was irrelevant and 
inadmissable because no reference to any existing roadway was contained in the 
Warranty Deed issued by Defendants to Plaintiffs. As such, Defendants were precluded 
from claiming the existence of a roadway predating the conveyance. 
Defendants, who were represented by different counsel at the time, filed a Notice 
of Appeal on or about March 30, 1999. On or about April 21,1999, Defendants filed their 
Motion for Summary Disposition and Plaintiffs filed their counter Motion for Summary 
Disposition on or about April 23, 1999. Then counsel for Defendants, Attorney Patrick H. 
Fenton, withdrew from the action on or about May 21, 1999. On or about June 1, 1999, 
the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and the appeal was 
dismissed until a final judgment was entered. A Notice of Entry of Appearance as Counsel 
was filed by the undersigned on or about August 11,1999 on behalf of Defendants. A trial 
was held on February 24, 2000. 
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On or about March 3, 
Findings of Fact and 
2000, Defendants filed their 
to file their Proposed 
March 17,2000. Defendants 
Summary Judgment Motions 
Findings of Fact and 
submitted their Proposed Fi 
on or about April 5, 2000. Or^  
Defendants' Motion for 
or about May 19, 2000 
Findings of Fact and 
The Court issued its Firhdings 
2000, Plaintiffs filed their Proposed Memorandum Decision, 
Conclusibns of Law and Proposed Decree. On or about March 8, 
Objection thereto and requested a 10-Day Extension in which 
Memorandum Decision. The Extension was granted on or about 
submitted a Motion for Reconsideration on Court's Ruling on 
along with their Closing Argument in Support of Motion for 
Conclusions of Law on or about March 27, 2000. Defendants 
ndings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proposed Decree 
or about April 10, 2000, Plaintiffs filed their Objection to 
Reconsideration on Ruling on Summary Judgment Motions. On 
Plaintiffs submitted their Response to Defendants' Objection to 
Conclusibns of Law and Notice to Submit to the Court. 
2000, and issued a Decree 
holding that an unplatted 
closed at Plaintiffs' expense, 
Defendants filed their Notice 
Footnotes, where necessary, 
1. Defendant Pine 
of developing a 
(R. 347: Pages 12, 13} 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on or about May 4, 
anb Judgment on or about May 24, 2000, in favor of Plaintiffs 
roadway of some degree did exist and ordered the same to be 
and awarding Plaintiff costs only. On or about June 21,2000, 
(if Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are set forth tp allow this Court to carefully review the issues in this case. 
(lelp aid the Court in examining the facts in proper context. 
Meadows Estates, Inc. is a Utah corporation formed for the purpose 
mountain estate subdivision which was accessible by an air strip 
2. Several different plats were filed with regard to several phases of the subdivision at 
different times in the Kane County Recorder's Office (R. 347: Pages 109-111). 
3. Prior to filing a plat, Defendant plowed the roads in the subdivision and had the road 
surveyed in order to draft the plats for future recording in the Kane County 
Recorder's Office (R. 347: Page 110). 
4. In order for the plats to be approved, it was necessary for all roads to be inspected. 
As such, construction on the roads commenced in 1966 (R. 347: Page 111). 
5. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347: Page 116). 
6. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which was there 
before the property was purchased. (R. 347: Pages117 -118, 155, 156, 177). 
7. Much of the development occurred within several future subdivisions at the same 
time even though plats for those subdivision had not yet been formally recorded with 
the Kane County Recorder's Office (R. 347: Page 112). 
8. The actual recording of Strawberry Valley plat occurred on May 10, 1968 and 
Ponderosa Villa plat was recorded in 1969 (R. 347: Page 110). 
9. Plaintiff purchased two (2) lots, Lots 30 and 39, both located within Strawberry 
Valley plat and issued checks for the same in 1968. (R. 347: Pages 27-28). 
10. At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded in 
across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The road is 
identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road (R. 347: Pages 112, 127). 
11. Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track 
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31). 
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Bill Pringle testified ttjiat when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178) 
Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347: Page 213) 
Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his cabin 
in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road in 1968. 
(R. 347: Pages 233-35) 
Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he went 
and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road. (JR. 347: Page 199). 
that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa Villa 
Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 201). 
that he knew the road was there before he built his cabin 
Wallace Hoist testified 
Subdivision was on thq 
Wallace Hoist testified 
which was in 1969 or 1970 
In 1970, Plaintiff commenced 
Plaintiff asserts that f i e 
through his property w$s 
Between 1973 and 1 
strangers on Valley Vibw 
not a significant amount 
In 1968 Milt Farney toik 
show them property in 
. (R. 347: Page 212) 
construction of his cabin (R. 347: Page 33). 
first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
on September 18, 1972 (R. 347: Page 35). 
$79, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed 
Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but that there was 
of use on the road until 1979 (R. 347: Page 40). 
many people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road to 
the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347: Page 119) 
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22. Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis between 
the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126) 
23. Bill Pringle traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis, 
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first time 
Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid 1990's. (R. 
347: Page 186). 
24. Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular 
basis, almost daily basis, several times a day, and never saw the road blocked in 
1973-74 or 1980 (R. 347: Page 219). 
25. Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular 
basis, on weekends and vacation days, especially memorial day weekends, in 1986 
and other years and he and never saw the road blocked. (R. 347: Page 221). 
26. Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers, forest 
service, pedestrians, and was able to use the road anytime he pleased. (R. 347: 
Pages 222-224). 
27. Harry Moyer testified that he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and recreational 
vehicles use the road. (R. 347: Page 240). 
28. Bill Pringle traveled the road daily but only saw the road blocked while the power 
line was being installed. He never saw the car block the driveway nor did he ever 
see any logs block the driveway. (R. 347: Pages 189-191) 
29. The only blocking Bill Pringle or Wallace Hoist saw was in the 1990's. (R. 347: 
Pages 189,204) 
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30. That since the creation bf the disputed road across Lots 38 and 39, the undisputed 
testimony is that the road has been open to the general public for forestry and 
public personnel, recreational, snowmobiling, recreational vehicles, hunting, ingress 
and egress of property owners throughout various subdivisions, the water truck and 
the general public. (R. 347: Pages 131 -133, 150,) 
31. That Warranty Deeds were issued by Pine Meadows Estates to Plaintiff James R. 
Wilhelm on January 6th, |l 972 for Lot 39 and September 25th, 1975 for Lot 38 (R. 84, 
85). 
32. Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road was temporarily blocked by a trench cut into the 
road for the purpose of installing electrical power to Plaintiff's cabin as well as other 
homeowners in the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision (R. 347: Page 50). 
33. Said trench was dug by {a private party to meet the requirements of GarKane Power 
(R. 347: Page 78). 
34. The trench was approximately four (4) feet deep and eighteen (18) inches wide (R. 
347: Page 82). 
35. The trench across the r]oad impeded traffic for approximately one week. (R. 347: 
Page 127) 
36. On Memorial Day weekend of 1980, Plaintiff asserts that he blocked Valley View 
DriveAA/ilhelm Road at b e top of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees (R. 347: Page 40, 
49). 
37. Plaintiff did not block the bottom of Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road at that time as 
he did not access his property (R. 347: Page 42). 
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38. Defendant asserts that when he returned in June of 1980, the logs had been cut up 
and removed (R. 347: Page 49). 
39. In 1986, Plaintiff testified that he blocked Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road with a 
1959 Oldsmobile (R. 347: Page 53). 
40. Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road was physically blocked again by Plaintiff in 1993 
(R. 347: Page 56). 
41. In 1993, Plaintiff placed construction materials across Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm 
Road (R. 347: Page 59). 
42. In 1996, Plaintiff was approached by Deputy Kitchen of the Kane County Sheriffs 
Department and informed that he was blocking a public roadway (R. 347: Page 68). 
43. After refusing to remove the debris, Plaintiff was cited for blocking a public road (R. 
347: Page 168). 
44. Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and Ponderosa 
Villa Subdivisions (R. 347: Pages 121-122). 
45. Kane County maintained the Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road for several years prior 
to the lawsuit. (R. 347: Pages 121-122). 
46. Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road at the top of 
the hill. (R. 347: Page 123) 
47. Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347: Page 247) 
48. Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special maps, he could 
locate the Valley View DriveAA/ilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line road. (R. 
347: Pages 250-252) 
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49. Paul Fullmer testified hb recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road in the 
mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for fire fighting 
and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc. (R. 347: Pages 252-
253). 
Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a well 
traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages 254, 258) 
Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255) 
Paul Fullmer uses the road to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court's 
60. 
51. 
52. 
use of the Valley View 
overwhelming evidence su 
traveled the road on a daily 
and blocked the road 
findings of fact with respect to the historical existence and 
Drivfe/Wilhelm Road were clearly erroneous because of the 
pp|orted by a multitude of witnesses who testified that they 
ba^is during the periods which Plaintiff testified he was present 
Furthermore Plaintiff testified that no road existed at the time he 
initially purchased the property which was unequivocally contradicted not only by testimony 
of numerous witnesses, but by several forest service aerial photographs which clearly 
depict a road traversing lots 3», 39 and 40 both prior to and after Plaintiffs purchase of his 
lots. The court also found in its Findings of Fact that the road existed prior to and after 
Plaintiff purchased the property 
POINT II 
The trial Court'i Findings of Fact that there was not a ten-year period of 
erroneous in that first and foremost there is virtually no uninterrupted use is clearly 
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Findings of Fact with regard to this issue. It is a fundamentally factual necessity to 
determine whether blockage of the road actually transpired and if so, whether the 
attempted blocking was sufficient to give the world notice of Plaintiffs intent to retain 
private dominion of the road. Furthermore, once a public road has been established for 
the necessary period, any attempt to block the road thereafter by Plaintiff was futile and 
wholly inadequate to effectively privatize the road. The only finding provided by the trial 
court supporting its Conclusions of Law was in Paragraph 36 which simply states that 
plaintiff undertook efforts to block access to the road with logs, vehicles, reliance upon 
trenching undertaken by others, and personal notice. The trial court categorically failed to 
define which, if any, of the blockages effectively obstructed use of the road, and if so when 
and which blocking were productive. This information is necessary to determine if a then-
year period of uninterrupted use occurred. 
POINT III 
The trial court's conclusions of law are not generally supported by the Court's 
own Findings of Fact. However, the real problem with several paragraphs in the conclusion 
is that it wholly fails to address mandatory issues and those issues addressed are 
incorrect as a matter of law. The conclusions sites a number of things which are irrelevant 
to the fundamental issue of whether a public road had been established. The most 
consequential question revolves around whether there was a ten-year (or more) 
uninterrupted use of the road by the general public. This conclusion summarily states that 
the road "is not" a public thoroughfare without and indicia of what does or does not 
constitute a public thoroughfare. 
POINT IV 
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If only one of the Plaintiffs 
utilized the road for a 10 year 
a public road is that the public 
Therefore the definition of" 
attempts to block the road are ineffective, then the public 
period. The fundamental statutory requirement to establish 
use be "continuous" for a period of not less than ten years. 
continuous use" is crucial in the determination of whether a 
road was, is or has become a "bublic" road. The trial court's cursory treatment of this issue 
in its findings of fact effectively eviscerate any rational conclusion of law and make it 
impossible to develop a logical conclusion as to whether there was an uninterrupted ten 
year period and whether a puplic road was established. 
POINT V 
The Court did not mak^ any specific findings with respect to any blockages of the 
road and this is a critical mistake by the Court because the ineffective blockages support 
the conclusion that Plaintiff effectively interrupted the statutory 10 year period of 
continuous use, as a matter off law-this is the heart and soul of this case. The Court is 
obligated to make clear and concise findings of fact to support its conclusions which it has 
not. 
POINT VI 
The trial court incorrectly found that there was not a 10 year period of use which was 
uninterrupted by Plaintiff's attempts to block the road. Plaintiffs attempt to block the road 
through reliance on Garkane's installation of an underground power line is completely 
groundless and not supported by law. The depositing of dead tree limbs and temporary 
blocking of the road with a car js also inadequate and failed to give adequate notice to the 
general public. 
POINT VII 
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The Trial Court must consider the entire history of the road in determining its 
existence as a public right-of-way and not from the date the deed was executed. By failing 
to consider the entire life of the road's existence, the court failed to properly apply the law 
which, while sparse and only discussed in dicta, indicates that public easements which are 
apparent and in their nature permanent and irremediable should be construed against the 
person receiving a warranty deed, presumably based on public policy. 
POINT VIII 
Upon issuance of a Warranty Deed, the grantor agrees to warrant the property, but 
as in any contractual obligation, the warranty is subject to the statute of limitations which 
commenced when Plaintiff Wilhelm viewed the disturbance. While the conclusions are 
unclear, it appears that the Court found that Defendant was bound by the Warranty Deed 
and could not assert the public road doctrine. This ruling is illogical and incorrect because 
the Statute of Limitations had run against Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ARE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT WITH RESPECT TO THE HISTORICAL 
EXISTENCE AND USE OF THE VALLEY VIEW 
DRIVE/WILHELM ROAD CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS? 
The question of whether the trial court's Finding of Fact are clearly erroneous is 
reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., State v. Pens, 869 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1994); State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). "The clearly erroneous 
standard 'requires that if the findings... are against the clear weight of the evidence, if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
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407 
made, the findings will be set 
In Re J.N., 960 P.2d 403, 
court's findings must marshal 
the marshaled evidence is 
the i 
(citing/nreJ.M.\/.,958P.2d 
In the present case 
historical existence and use ol 
ajside.'" State v. C.A., 995 P.2d 17 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
(Utah App. 1998)). "In addition, a party challenging the 
evidence in support of those findings, and then show that 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the findings." Id. 
^43, 947 (Utah App. 1998)). 
Court made the following findings with respect to the 
the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road: 
the 
8. 
9. 
14. 
15. 
17. 
33. 
vehicle-1 
forestry 
aerial 
Court 
of time 
One of 
by plaintiffs 
of Lot 40. 
The 
and 
thb 
At the 
defendant 
Pringle, 
selling acj 
agent of 
The 
and 40 
the time 
selling 
grading 
occurred 
During 
the 
thte 
Prior to recording any of the subdivision plats, and in the area 
encompassed by the same, there were several old unimproved one-
w dth roads that had been used by loggers, hunters, ranchers, 
personnel and others. These old roads are barely visible on 
photography dating to the early 1960's and supplied to the 
roads consisted essentially of tire tracks left over a period 
appear not to follow a well-thought plan, 
old roads crossed portions of Lots 38 and 39, purchased 
from defendant Pine Meadows, and also crossed a corner 
time of the purchase, plaintiff James R. Wilhelm and the 
Pine Meadows, through its duly authorized agent Bill 
Walked over and inspected the two lots. Pringle was the 
gent in the deal with plaintiffs. Pringle acted as the selling 
Pine Meadows for some 100 lots between 1968 and 1990. 
evidence was inconclusive as to when the road across lots 38,39 
was first graded. Plaintiffs remembered it was not graded at 
6f purchase. Pine Meadows' president said it was, but its 
agent, Pringle, thought it may not have been. The initial 
effort was much more narrow and conservative than later 
Plaintiffs Accessed their property from the platted road fronting the 
same. They likely followed an old logger/hunter road (the Valley View 
Drive/Wilnelm Road) to get to the cabin site, but it was necessary to 
perform some earth work to access this old road from the platted road 
which had been cut along the mountain slope. 
1970's and into the 1980's the amount of development in 
various subdivision plats in proximity to Lots 38 and 39 was 
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limited, and accordingly the amount of vehicular traffic in the area was 
likewise limited. 
35. During the 1970's and into the 1980's there was some use of the old 
road across Lots 38,39 and 40 by others who had constructed cabins 
in the general vicinity. This use, however, was both limited and 
sporadic because there as simply not an extensive amount of 
development on the mountain at that time. 
37. Plaintiffs' blocking efforts were not exhaustive but neither was the 
amount of use. Moreover, the use appears essentially to have been 
made by neighbors within the subdivisions developed by Pine 
Meadows as opposed to members of the general public. 
A. Evidence Supporting Findings 
1. Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track 
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31). 
2. Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178). 
3. Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35). 
B. Evidence Contrary to Findings 
1. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347: Page 116). 
2. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which was there 
before the property was purchased by Defendants. (R. 347: Pages 117 -118; 155-. 
156; 177). 
3. At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded in 
across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The road is 
identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages 112, 127). 
4. Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track 
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31). 
5. Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178) 
6. Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347: Page 213) 
7. Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his cabin 
in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road in 1968. 
(R. 347: Pages 233-35) 
8. Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he went 
and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 199). 
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9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Wallace Hoist testified I that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa Villa 
Subdivision was on the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 201). 
Wallace Hoist testified that he knew the road was there before he built his cabin 
which was in 1969 or 1970. (R. 347: Page 212) 
In 1970, Plaintiff commenced construction of his cabin. (R. 347: Page 33). 
Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35). 
Between 1973 and 1979, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed 
strangers on Valley V ew Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but claimed that 
there was not a significant amount of use on the road until 1979. (R. 347: Page 40). 
In 1968, Milt Farney took numerous people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
to show them property n the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347: Page 119) 
Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis between 
the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126) 
Bill Pringle traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis, 
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first time 
Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid 1990's. (R. 
347: Page 186). 
traveled the Valtey View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular 
sometimes several times a day, and never saw the road 
980. (R. 347: Page 219). 
graveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular 
I vacation days, especially memorial day weekends, in 1986 
I and never saw the road blocked. (R. 347: Page 221). 
Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers, forest 
service, pedestrians, and was able to use the road anytime he pleased. (R. 347: 
Pages 222-224). 
Harry Moyer testified that he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and recreational 
vehicles use the road. (R. 347: Page 240). 
Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and Ponderosa 
Villa Subdivisions including the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages 
121-122). 
Kane County maintained the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road for several years prior 
to the lawsuit. (R. 347: Pages 121-122). 
Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road at the top of 
Ronald Lloyd Graham 
basis, daily basis, and 
blocked in 1973-74 or ' 
Ronald Lloyd Graham 
basis, on weekends and 
and other years and he 
the hill. (R. 347: Page 123) 
Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347: Page 247) 
Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special miaps, he could 
locate the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line road. (R. 
347: Pages 250-252) 
Paul Fullmer testified he recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road in the 
mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for fire fighting 
and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc. (R. 347: Pages 252-
253). 
Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a well 
traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages 254, 258). 
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28. Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255). 
29. Paul Fullmer uses the road to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255). 
C. Conclusion 
As is evident from the marshaled evidence, the Court had before it numerous 
individuals who were familiar with and had in fact used the road long before Plaintiffs came 
on the scene. In fact, the Trial Court found in its Finding No. 8 and 9, as set forth above, 
that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was already in existence at the time Plaintiffs 
purchase the property and the only apparent dispute was as to its graded condition. 
Additionally, the Court had before it numerous witnesses who were in and around the 
property and the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road far more often than Plaintiffs. The Court 
admitted as much in its Finding No. 34 wherein it stated that: 
Also during the 1970's and into the 1980's the plaintiff James 
R. Wilhelm was actively involved in a professional career 
outside the state of Utah and along with his wife was only an 
infrequent visitor to the cabin they constructed. 
All the witnesses who testified about the historical existence of the road and its use, with 
the exception of Plaintiff, who was nothing more than an "infrequent visitor", testified that 
the road had existed long before the subdivision was developed and that it received 
extensive use both by them and by others witnessed by them. And, each of the witnesses 
who so testified, with the exception of Plaintiff, spent most of the summers and a good 
portion of the winters resident on the property and used the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm 
Road. 
This is important. The Court had before it witnesses who testified extensively about 
the historical and continued use of the road. The Court had not one witness before it that 
could actually and credibly contradict this testimony-not one. The only witness for 
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Plaintiffs was Plaintiff, James R. Wilhelm, and he admitted that he was very rarely at the 
site. In fact, even the Court Admitted this very important and salient fact as set forth in 
Finding No. 34. The reality is ^hat the testimony of those that frequently traveled the road 
and witnessed others doing Ihe same stands before the Trial Court and this Court 
uncontradicted. 
It is clear, therefore, aftkr Defendants have marshaled the evidence, that the Trial 
Court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and that a mistake has been 
made. As a result, this Court should set aside any and all findings that attempt to limit both 
the historical existence of the jroad and the scope and amount of its use. 
POINT II 
IS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
THERE WAS NOT A TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF 
UNINTERRUPTED USE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS? 
The trial court made tl|ie following finding with respect to a ten-year period of 
uninterrupted use: 
44. At no time between the time of contracting to purchase Lots 38 and 
39 and the filing of this law suit was there a ten year period of 
uninterrupted us<k of the disputed road by members of the public. 
Appellants submit that this "finding" is actually a conclusion. In so far as it is a conclusion, 
its legal sufficiency is discussed and challenged hereafter. Through an abundance of 
caution and to assist this Court in understanding the problems inherent in this statement, 
whether it is a finding or conclusion, Appellants will treat this statement as if it were a 
finding and go through the marshaling exercise. 
A. Evidence Supporting Finding 
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1. Plaintiff testified that in 1973 the road was temporarily blocked by Garkane 
Power, and/or its agents, who dug a trench across the road for the purpose 
of installing underground power lines to supply power to lot owners in the 
subdivision. (R. 347: Pages 50, 78). The trench was approximately 4 feet 
deep, 18 inches across and impeded traffic on the road for approximately 
one week. (R. 347: Pages 78, 82, 127). 
2. Plaintiff further testified that on Memorial Day Weekend in 1980, he blocked 
the road at the top of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees. (R. 347: Pages 40, 49). 
Plaintiff further testified that in June of 1980 he drove the road and there 
were no aspen trees blocking the road. (R. 347: Page 49). 
3. Plaintiff also testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the 
road for a period of two or three days. (R. 347: Page 53). Plaintiff thereafter 
testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle out of the road. (R. 347: 
Page 55). 
4. Plaintiff further testified that in 1993 he pulled construction material across 
the road in an attempt to block the same. (R. 347: Page 59). 
B. Evidence Contrary to Finding 
1. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347: 
Page 116). 
2. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which 
was there before the property was purchased by Defendants. (R. 347: Pages 
117-118, 155-156, 177). 
3. At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded 
in across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The 
road is identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages 
112, 127). 
4. Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel 
drive track crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31). 
5. Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178) 
6. Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347: 
Page 213) 
7. Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his 
cabin in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow 
road in 1968. (R. 347: Pages 233-35) 
8. Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he 
went and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley 
View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 199). 
9. Wallace Hoist testified that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa 
Villa Subdivision was on the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 
201). 
10. Wallace Hoist testified that he knew the road was there before he built his 
cabin which was in 1969 or 1970. (R. 347: Page 212) 
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11. In 1970, Plaintiff!commenced construction of his cabin. (R. 347: Page 33). 
12. Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View DriveA/Vilhelm Road 
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35). 
13. Between 1973 and 1979, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed 
strangers on Va ley View Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but claimed 
that there was not a significant amount of use on the road until 1979. (R. 
347: Page 57). 
14. In 1968, Milt Farney took numerous people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm 
Road to show them property in the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347: 
Page 119) 
15. Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis 
between the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126) 
16. Bill Pringle trave ed the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis, 
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first 
time Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid 
1990's. (R. 347: Page 186). 
17. Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a 
regular basis, daily basis, and sometimes several times a day, and never 
saw the road blocked in 1973-74 or 1980. (R. 347: Page 219). 
18. Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a 
regular basis, on weekends and vacation days, especially memorial day 
weekends, in 1986 and other years and he and never saw the road blocked. 
(R. 347: Page 221). 
19. Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers, 
forest service, pedestrians, and was able to use the road anytime he 
pleased. (R. 347: Pages 222-224). 
20. Harry Moyer testified that he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and 
recreational vehicles use the road. (R. 347: Page 240). 
21. Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and 
Ponderosa Villa Subdivisions including the Valley View DriveA/Vilhelm Road. 
(R. 347: Pages 121-122). 
22. Kane County maintained the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road for several 
years prior to thd lawsuit. (R. 347: Pages 121-122). 
23. Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road at the 
top of the hill. (R. 347: Page 123) 
24. Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347: 
Page 247) 
25. Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special maps, he 
could locate the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line 
road. (R. 347: pkges 250-252) 
26. Paul Fullmer testified he recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
in the mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for 
fire fighting and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc. 
(R. 347: Page 2^2-253). 
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27. Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was 
a well traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages 
254, 258). 
28. Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255). 
29. Paul Fullmer uses the road to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255). 
C. Conclusion 
There are two things to consider here. First, and this is discussed in more detail 
below, whether the blockings testified to by Plaintiff were sufficient to interrupt the public's 
use of the road and prevent uninterrupted use for a period of ten-years. Appellants argue 
below that such blockings do not constitute an interruption of the use of the road as 
required by law. Second, is whether the finding is clearly erroneous. All of Plaintiffs 
testimony involved minor blockages such as trees or a vehicle placed in the road for a very 
brief period of time or even a blockage by another entity altogether that Plaintiff tries to use 
to his benefit as if it demonstrated his intent to exclude the public therefrom. Before this 
Finding could be operative as either a finding or a conclusion the trial court would have had 
to find or conclude that the above blockages were sufficient to prevent a ten-year 
uninterrupted use of the road. The trial court never made this kind of a finding or 
conclusion. As such, therefore, this Finding is not supported by the evidence, is clearly 
erroneous and a mistake has been made and this Court should overturn and/or strike this 
Finding in its entirety. 
POINT III 
ARE THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS 
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND/OR ARE THE CONCLUSIONS 
CORRECT? 
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The question of whether 
conclusions of law is reviewed 
782 (Utah 1991); Kunzler v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (U 
a trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to support its 
for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
'De//, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993); Woodward v. 
ah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Id. 
0 
App. 1991). Additionally, 
The trial court did not niimber its conclusions of law but instead opted to make them 
in a narrative manner. Appellants therefore refer to the conclusions by paragraph number 
so as to aid this Court in it^ review of the conclusions and in following Appellants' 
argument. 
Ldts 
services i 
When Pine 
directors selected 
formal plats, it 
included. The evidence 
not include as a plattecpl 
crossed a portion of 
roads, one of which 
roadway in question, 
dedicated roads as 
additional access or 
have been shown on 
defendants or the 
them to the status of 
excluded encumber 
unencumbered. The 
the recordation of 
minimum permissible 
Moreover, Pine 
statutory guarantee of 
from all encumbrances 
defend the title 
Under the facts of this 
1. Paragraph 1 
Meadows and its close circle of owners, officers and 
among the old unimproved roads those for inclusion in its 
necessarily evidenced its intent to abandon others not so 
is clear that, for whatever reason, defendants did 
road the old logger/hunter road which apparently 
38, 39 and 40. Rather, defendants platted new 
the same purpose historically served by the old 
kane County accepted the plats with the lots and 
shown thereon. If the County or the defendants required 
intended some other road to be recognized, it should 
plat. It is untenable as a matter of law for either 
Courity to include some old unimproved roads, elevating 
platted roads, exclude others and then claim those 
lots which appear on the face of the plat to be 
incongruence of such a claim is further heightened by 
restrictive covenants which provide that each lot is at a 
and preclude any sale or disposition otherwise. 
Meadows' conveyance by warranty deed carried with it the 
'quiet possession" and "that the premises are free 
and that Pine Meadows would "forever warrant and 
against all lawful claims whatsoever."1 UCA §57-1-12. 
, these defendants are precluded from asserting qase, 
1
 This statement is contralry to the applicable statute of limitations that is discussed 
elsewhere in this Brief. 
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that a public thoroughfare existed when the plats were recorded in 1968 and 
1969 and when the deeds were issued to plaintiffs in 1972 and 1975; and 
this is so even if the proof were sufficient to establish a pre-existing "public 
thoroughfare" which the Court concludes it is not. 
Analysis 
Some of the above conclusion is arguably supported by the findings. However, the 
real problem with this conclusion is that it does not speak to the issues in this case and 
insofar as it does it is incorrect as a matter of law. The conclusions sites a number of 
things including Appellants' failure to properly record the Pine Valley/Wilhelm road on the 
plat that was accepted by Kane County, the size of the lots and the issuance of warranty 
deeds. None of these things or the others cited in the conclusion are relevant to the issue 
of the public thoroughfare. If there was a public thoroughfare it would not matter if the road 
was not recorded on the deed, size of the lots or the warranty deeds. The question 
revolves around whether there was a ten-year (or more) uninterrupted use of the road. 
This conclusion summarily, and without any relevant support in the findings, simply states 
that the road "is not" a public thoroughfare without any of the legally sufficient indicia of 
what constitutes or does not constitute a public thoroughfare. This conclusion is full of 
legal error, is not supported by any relevant findings, is conclusory in nature and should 
be set aside. 
2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 
(2) Defendants' claim that a public thoroughfare thereafter came into 
existence is not supported by the facts. The governing statute, §72-5-104, 
provides as follows: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years. 
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convncing 
• thi t 
The law in Utah is well 
to prove dedication to 
which is clear and 
the property owner and 
It has also been held 
visitors is not sufficienj 
numbered in the class 
a fashion that might 
must be such that it is 
a general right of 
unambiguous acts by 
public from uninterrupted 
period must begin anevy 
Of 
np^n 
fettled that the burden of proof is on the side trying 
the public. This burden can only be met by proof 
Moreover, there is a presumption in favor of 
his ownership is accorded a high degree of sanctity, 
use by neighboring landowners and their personal 
|t to prove public use. These persons cannot be 
members of the general public using such road in 
into a dedication under the road statute. The use 
"thoroughfare" where members of the public have 
Finally, it is generally recognized that 
owner which evidences an intention to exclude the 
use destroys the prescriptive right and the 10-year 
passage, 
'the 
(Citations omitted.) 
The evidence laid 
and convincing". Defendants 
over a couple of decadps 
most part this was use 
services to them; and ^he 
during the early years, 
reduced the occurrences 
others' efforts to use. 
evidence plaintiffs' intent 
Furthermore, the blockade 
that were of a permanent 
plaintiffs where not around. 
before the Court by defendants was less than "clear 
called several persons that testified of the use 
before being completely blocked out, but for the 
by neighboring lot-owners, or those who provided 
absence of extensive development, particularly 
lijnited the nature and opportunity for conflict and also 
where plaintiffs' efforts to blockade coincided with 
But some confrontations did exist, sufficient to 
to exclude the public from uninterrupted use. 
devices employed by plaintiffs, including those 
nature during the 1990's, were removed when 
Analysis 
Appellants have no problem with paragraph 2 insofar as it accurately states the law. 
The real problem is evident in paragraph 3. Appellants' witnesses who testified to using 
the road and witnessing others using the road were not neighboring landowners or those 
providing services to them. There are no findings supporting this statement. Additionally, 
the law states that "adjoining landowners" may not claim a public thoroughfare, it does not 
state that "neighboring landowners" may not claim a public thoroughfare. Marden R. Kohler 
and Joy J. Kohler v. Martin, 9]I6 P.2d 910 (1996). None of Appellants' witnesses were 
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adjoining landowners. Therefore, this is an erroneous statement and this Court should set 
it aside. 
Additionally, the trial court states that the level of development in the subdivision 
directly correlated to the level and amount of traffic on the road and that this erroneous fact 
is somehow relevant. There is no finding supporting this conclusion. The only evidence 
(although there must be a finding) was a statement made by Plaintiff who by the trial 
court's own admission was a very infrequent visitor to the property (see Finding of Fact 
number 34) and had no real ongoing knowledge of how the road was used and by whom. 
Moreover, Plaintiff's statement is clearly contradicted by all of Appellant's witnesses who 
frequently used and witnessed others using the road during all times relevant to this action. 
None of them testified that the amount of development was somehow related to the 
amount of traffic on the road since many of them used the road all the time and witnessed 
members of the public using the road for recreational purposes regardless of the level of 
development. This statement is both erroneous and irrelevant and should be set aside. 
The trial court next discusses the fact that since there was little development and 
little traffic there were not many confrontations between Plaintiff and people trying to use 
the road although such confrontations existed and said confrontations were sufficient to 
evidence plaintiffs' intent to exclude the public from "uninterrupted" use. This is again an 
erroneous and irrelevant statement. There was only one confrontation that Plaintiff 
testified to and that was with a person now deceased. Plaintiff did indicate that when he 
was there he told people trying to use the road not to and that they generally respected his 
wishes. However, the trial court found that Plaintiff was but an infrequent visitor to the 
property. Therefore, there simply could not have been that many confrontations especially 
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because the trial court has made the claim that travel over the road was infrequent due to 
the lack of development. Thus, the confrontations, if any, did not rise to the level of 
constituting a "blockage" of the road sufficient to defeat a claim of a public thoroughfare. 
This point is covered in significant detail below. 
Finally, the trial court claims that the blockages Plaintiff put in the road were 
removed when he was not around. Appellants are not certain the relevance of this 
statement. The few and inadequate blockages that Plaintiff placed on the road were 
always quickly removed. 
The conclusions of law, 
Conclusion 
besides being confusing, are not supported by the findings 
and those that are have no relevance or impact upon the ultimate question of whether a 
public thoroughfare existed and they certainly do not defeat a claim of a public 
thoroughfare. As such, Appellants request that this Court overturn and/or set aside the 
erroneous conclusions of law. 
POINT IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THERE WAS NOT AN UNINTERRUPTED 
TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF USE OF THE ROAD 
BY THE PUBLIC PRIOR TO PLAINTIFFS' 
PERMANENT BLOCKING THEREOF 
The critical nature of th& trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law will now become readily apparent. As stated above, one of the statutory 
public road is that the public use be "continuous" for a period 
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2000). Therefore the 
is crucial in the determination of whether a road was, is or 
requirements to establish a 
of not less than ten years, 
definition of "continuous use" 
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has become a "public" road. Again, the trial court to gloss over these important definitions 
and criteria and did not make adequate findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect 
thereto. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Crane v. Crane, 683 P:2d 1062 (Utah 1984) specifically 
addressed the issue of "continuous use" in determining whether a prescriptive easement 
had attached to a property, as follows: 
A need not be "regular" or "constant" in order to be 
"continuous." All that is necessary is that the use be as often 
as is required by the nature of the use and the needs of the 
claimant. 
Id at 1064 (citing Richards v. Pine Ranches, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977). 
Defendants introduced the following testimony at trial with respect to the use of the 
road: 
1. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was constructed in 1966. (R. 347: Page 116). 
2. The Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road followed an old Timber Road which was there 
before the property was purchased by Defendants. (R. 347: Page 117 -118, 155-
156, 177). 
3. At the time Plaintiff purchased the properties, a rough road had been graded in 
across Lots 30 and 39, linking Strawberry Valley to Ponderosa Villa. The road is 
identified as the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages 112, 127). 
4. Plaintiff asserts that no road traversed the property, but only a four-wheel drive track 
crossed Lot 38. (R. 347: Page 31). 
5. Aerial photographs clearly depict the establishment of the road. (R. Trial Court-
Exhibits 6-13; not provided by Court: See attached addendum) 
6. Bill Pringle testified that when Plaintiff purchased the lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road. (R. 347: Page 178) 
7. Wallace Hoist testified that when he purchased his lot, the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road when he was first there. (R. 347: Page 213) 
8. Harry Moyer testified that he purchased his lot in 1967, and constructed his cabin 
in 1968 and that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a narrow road in 1968. 
(R. 347: Page 233-35) 
9. Wallace Hoist testified that he purchased a lot in 1968 and testified that he went 
and looked at the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision and drove up the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page199). 
10. Wallace Hoist testified that the only way he new how to get to Ponderosa Villa 
Subdivision was on the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Page 201). 
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11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
Wallace Hoist testified Ithat he knew the road was there before he built his cabin 
which was in 1969 or 1970. (R. 347: Page 212) 
In 1970, Plaintiff commenced construction of his cabin. (R. 347: Page 33) 
Plaintiff asserts that the first time he noticed Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
through his property was on September 18, 1972. (R. 347: Page 35). 
Between 1973 and 1979, Plaintiff admitted that, on occasion, they witnessed 
strangers on Valley Vew Drive/Wilhelm Road with Mr. Farney but claimed that 
there was not a significant amount of use on the road until 1979. (R. 347: Page 57). 
In 1968, Milt Farney took numerous people up the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
to show them property n the Ponderosa Villa Subdivision. (R. 347: Page 119) 
Milt Farney traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis between 
the years 1967 through 1980. (R. 347: Page 126) 
Bill Pringle traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a daily basis, 
sometimes hundreds of times each summer between 1968-1990 and the first time 
Pringle ever had knowledge that the road was blocked was in the mid 1990's. (R. 
347: Page 186). 
Ronald Lloyd Graham 
basis, daily basis, and 
blocked in 1973-74 or 1 
traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular 
sometimes several times a day, and never saw the road 
980. (R. 347: Page 219). 
Ronald Lloyd Graham traveled the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road on a regular 
basis, on weekends ana vacation days, especially memorial day weekends, in 1986 
and other years and he and never saw the road blocked. (R. 347: Page 221). 
Ronald Lloyd Graham testified that he saw strangers, hunters, snowmobilers, forest 
service, pedestrians, dnd was able to use the road anytime he pleased. (R. 347: 
Pages 222-224). 
Harry Moyer testified thkt he saw strangers, hunters, pedestrians, and recreational 
vehicles use the road. «R. 347: Page 240). 
Kane County maintained all of the roads in the Strawberry Valley and Ponderosa 
Villa Subdivisions including the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road. (R. 347: Pages 
121-122) 
Kane County maintained the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road for several years prior 
to the lawsuit. (R. 347 Page 121-122). 
Kane County placed a yield sign on Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road at the top of 
the hill. (R. 347: Page 123) 
Paul Fullmer was the fire chief of Cedar Mountain Fire District. (R. 347: Page 247) 
Paul Fullmer testified that as a person who is familiar with special nnaps, he could 
locate the Valley View prive/Wilhelm Road on the 1960 map as a line road. (R. 
347: Pages 250-252) 
Paul Fullmer testified hfe recalled using the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road in the 
mid-1960's because of the post sale timber, and that he utilized it for fire fighting 
and other forestry purposes such as tree planting, logging, etc. (R. 347: Pages 252-
253). 
Paul Fullmer testified that prior to 1967 Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road was a well 
traveled road, and that he personally drove it in 1966. (R. 347: Pages 254, 258). 
Paul Fullmer saw hunters use the road. (R. 347: Page 255). 
Paul Fullmer uses the r|oad to get access to forest land. (R. 347: Page 255). 
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31. Forest service aerial photographs show that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm Road 
existed in 1960 as a mountain road. (Trial Court- Exhibit 6; not provided by Court: 
See attached addendum)2 
32. Forest service aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm 
Road existed as an improved road in 1967. (Trial Court- Exhibit 10; not provided 
by Court: See attached addendum)3 
33. Forest service close-up aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road existed as an improved road in 1967. (Trial Court- Exhibit 11; 
not provided by Court: See attached addendum)4 
34. Forest service aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View Drive/Wilhelm 
Road existed in 1977. (Trial Court- Exhibit 12; not provided by Court: See Attached 
Addendum)5 
35. Forest service close-up aerial photographs clearly show that the Valley View 
Drive/Wilhelm Road existed as an improved road in 1977. (Trial Court- Exhibit 13; 
not provided by Court: See attached addendum)6 
36. The difference in the condition of the road between 1967 and 1976 is minor as 
evidenced by a comparison of the two photographs. (Trial Court- ExhibitslO, 12; 
not provided by Court: See Attached Addendum) 
The above testimony clearly demonstrates that the road was subject to "continuous 
use" by numerous individuals most of whom had also seen others, often strangers, 
frequently using the road. Even Plaintiff admitted that when he was present, which was 
seldom, he also saw strangers use the road and when asked not to, they complied with his 
requests. Furthermore, the road accesses forest property and was open to hunters, 
snowmobilers, and other recreationists as well as forest personnel. 
2
 Plaintiff requested a copy of all documents from the Trial Court but was provided only a 
copy of the transcript and pleadings. No Exhibits presented at the time of trial were provided. 
Because of the limited number of Exhibits utilized in Plaintiffs brief a motion by Plaintiff 
requesting this Court to order transfer of the Exhibits to the Court of Appeals has been submitted 
contemporaneously herewith. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
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The next critical questidn is whether any of Plaintiffs' verbal protestations, blocking 
attempts, or those imputed to him such as the trench dug by Garkane Power, were 
sufficient to cause a blocking of the road so as to defeat any ten-year period of 
uninterrupted use. In Memmottv. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court was faced with a set of facts similar to the present case. In Memmott, the plaintiffs 
erected a gate across a road iji dispute and placed great reliance on the existence of the 
was not a public thoroughfare because of the "break" in 
erection of the gate. The Court looked to the history of the 
a road were a public thoroughfare before the gate was 
gate in showing that the road 
usage allegedly caused by the 
road and determined that "if 
the 
thkt 
originally constructed under 
"the public." Id. at 753. Tes 
uninterested party indicates 
by forestry personnel and oth^r 
findings with respect to the 
8. 
.there 
Prior to recording 
by the same, 
had been used 
These old roads 
1960's and supplied 
tracks left over a 
One of the old 
plaintiffs from de 
erected, the erection of the gatp does not change the public nature of the road." Id. at 753 
(citing Sullivan v. Condas, 290 IP. 954 (1930). The Memmott Court also took judicial notice 
as to the purpose for which th^ road was originally constructed. In its final determination 
the Court relied on what it termed "substantial" evidence that showed the road had been 
protection of federal statute on public lands by hands of 
imony in the present case, as indicated above, from an 
there was a use of the Wilhelm road prior to 1966 for use 
members of the public. The court made the following 
of a road: exstence 
any of the subdivision plats, and in the area encompassed 
were several old unimproved one-vehicle-width roads that 
by loggers, hunters, ranchers, forestry personnel and others. 
are barely visible on aerial photography dating to the early 
to the court. The roads consisted essentially of tire 
period of time and appear not to follow a well-thought plan. 
roads crossed portions of Lots 38 and 39, purchased by 
fendant Pine Meadows, and also crossed a corner of Lot 40. 
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In order to block a road that has either become a public road or to interrupt a ten 
year period of uninterrupted use, there must be an actual interference with the claimant's 
use by means of erecting physical obstacles or otherwise use of the servient parcel in such 
a manner so as to prevent the adverse use. It is not sufficient to attempt an interruption 
of the public use. See, e.g., Margoline v. Holefelder, 218 A.2d 227, 228 (Pa. 1966) 
(holding that a blockade of a disputed driveway for two days did not constitute actual 
interruption when there was no evidence of attempted use). It is also not sufficient to 
render a use less convenient. See, e.g., Brown v. Ware, 630 P.2d 545, 547 n.2 (Ariz. App. 
1981) (holding that the stringing of barbed wire across a roadway was deemed insufficient 
to interrupt usage where the wire was knocked down a day after it was erected); South 
Norwalk Lodge v. Palco Hats, Inc., 100 A.2d 735, 737 (Conn. 1953) (stating that claimant 
continually removed barriers from right-of-way and continued use thereof); King v. Corsini, 
335 N.E.2d 561, 565 (III. App. 1975) (holding that acts of landowner blocking road for short 
periods did not interrupt public use). The obstruction must in fact interfere with the 
claimant's usage. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n 
v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 404 S.E.2d 677, 687 (N.C. 1991); Reed v. Piedimonte, 138 A.2d 
937, 937 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that there was no evidence that the erections of temporary 
barriers "ever effectively interfered with, or disturbed, plaintiffs continuous use of the 
driveway"). 
In Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894 (1937), the court stated that: 
To interrupt the continuity of the adverse occupant's possession, there must 
be a physical interruption of the adverse possession, or a suit or some 
unequivocal act of ownership which interrupts the exercise of the right 
claimed and being enjoyed by the adverse claimant. 2 C.J.S., Adverse 
Possession, p. 701, and cases cited. Such interruption of the adverse 
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claimants occupancy 
the same definite 
user, to stop the 
character as must the 
statute running. The 
of right such as to 
dispossess the 
must bear on its face 
on user, to stop the running of the statute, must be of 
chaijacter as must the adverse claimant's occupancy or 
running of the statute, must be of the same definite 
adverse claimant's possession and user be to start the 
interruption must be open, notorious, and under claim 
manifest an intention to repossess the property and 
occupant, and be a challenge to his right and dominion. It 
unequivocal intention to take possession. an 
There was never a 
thoroughfare once it existed. I 
in Memmott, then certainly 
protestations to a few passer-
There were three 
Plaintiff purchased the land 
And, of critical importance, 
imputed to them in order to 
James R. Wilhelm, testified 
blocked, on the following 
one 
1. Plaintiff testified 
Garkane Power, 
for the purpose 
to lot owners in 
2. Plaintiff further 
the road at the 
sufficient effort on the part of Plaintiff to block the public 
|f the erection of a gate blocking the roadway was insufficient 
the minimal efforts by Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs verbal 
^yes, prior to 1993, fall woefully short as set forth hereafter. 
attempts to block the road in the present case between the time 
the initiation of this lawsuit-a period of over thirty years. 
of the blockages was not even by Plaintiffs and cannot be 
prevent the ten-year period of uninterrupted use. Plaintiff, 
he attempted to block the road, or at least the road was 
and 
that 
occasions: 
Of 
that in 1973-74 the road was temporarily blocked by 
and/or its agents, who dug a trench across the road 
installing underground power lines to supply power 
(he subdivision. (R. 347: Pages 50, 78).7 
testified that on Memorial Day Weekend in 1980, he blocked 
of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees. (R. 347: Pages 40, 49). tpp 
This 
7
 As set forth below, the 
efforts of Plaintiffs to block the 
exclude the public therefrom 
nothing to do with Plaintiffs' efforts 
their desire to exclude the public 
were even aware of this blockage 
tried to use it to their advantage, 
a ten-year period of uninterrupted 
examine the individual blockages 
(tourt allowed this blocking to somehow be imputed to the 
ijoad and as a manifestation to the public of their efforts to 
is patently absurd and contrary to the law. This blockage had 
and furthermore could not be considered a manifestation of 
therefrom. There is also a question as to whether Plaintiffs 
before they began to prepare for this action at which point they 
Also, as argued below, without this blockage there clearly was 
use. This is why it is so critical that this Court be able to 
which the Trial Court utterly failed to identify. 
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Plaintiff further testified that in June of 1980 he drove the road and there 
were no aspen trees blocking the road. (R. 347: Page 49). 
3. Plaintiff also testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the 
road for a period of a few days. (R. 347: Page 53). Plaintiff thereafter 
testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle out of the road. (R. 347: 
Page 55). 
4. Plaintiff further testified that in 1993 he pulled construction material across 
the road in an attempt to block the same. (R. 347: Page 59).8 
None of these blockages constitute a sufficient blockage or interference with use to defeat 
a claim of a ten-year uninterrupted use. However, each blockage deserves some 
additional analysis. 
1973 Blockage 
Plaintiff testified that the road was temporarily blocked in 1973 by Garkane Power, 
a local utility, for the purpose of digging a trench to bury electrical power lines. Plaintiffs 
had nothing to do with this blocking other than facilitating the unified ordering of power by 
a group of homeowners desiring power. Appellants are aware of no law, in any jurisdiction, 
that would allow the imputation of this blockage to Plaintiffs and that it somehow 
manifested Plaintiffs' intent to keep the public from using the road. The claim that it 
somehow can be imputed to Plaintiffs is patently absurd. It should also be noted that 
defendant's witnesses have no collection of the trench blocking the road indicating that it 
did not last as long and Plaintiff claims. 
Plaintiffs purchased their lots in 1968. Even if this Court does not allow Appellants 
to go back earlier than Plaintiffs' purchase of their lots, the first attempt to block the road 
8
 As set forth below, Defendants are not challenging the sufficiency of the blockages 
after 1990. The question of the actual or adequacy of the blockages in the 1970s and 1980s 
however goes to the heart of the Trial Court's findings and conclusions with respect to the 
existence of lack of existence of a ten-year uninterrupted period of use. 
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by Plaintiffs was in 1980, as d scussed below. Therefore, if the Garkane Power trenching 
is not counted as a blockage by Plaintiffs, there was an uncontroverted twelve-year 
uninterrupted period of use by the public prior to Plaintiffs' attempt to block the road in 
1980. As set forth above, all pat is required is a ten-year period of uninterrupted use of 
the road. 
1980 Blockage 
Plaintiff testified that dn Memorial Day Weekend in 1980 he pulled some dead 
aspen trees across the road qt the top of his property. He further testified that in June of 
later, he drove the road and the aspen trees had been 
Is witnesses, who used the road on a regular basis, had any 
that year, only a few weeks 
removed. None of Defendant!: 
interfere with the public's use 
knowledge of this minor and very temporary attempt to block the road in 1980. 
Furthermore, this blockade fai s to provide any notification to the general public of an intent 
to impede traffic. Dead aspen trees are indigenous to the area and could have been 
construed by any passerby as a simple failure to fasten down a load of debris being 
transported for either firewood or disposal on forest land. 
As is evident from the case law set forth above, the blockage must be of a 
substantial nature and it must actually interfere with use of the road. The aspen tree 
blockage was temporary, minor and it was removed almost immediately. As such it did not 
of the road and cannot, as a matter of law, be considered 
a sufficient blockage of the road to defeat its uninterrupted use. The next blockage didn't 
occur until 1986 and if the 1980 blockage was insufficient to defeat uninterrupted use of 
the road, which it is not, then there was a period running from 1968 to 1986 (18 years) 
without an adequate attempt tp block the road. And even if this Court considered it such, 
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the road in question already has more than a ten-year period of uninterrupted use. The 
nature of this blockage therefore must be so substantial and of such duration that it will 
defeat what has already become a public thoroughfare-a few dead aspen trees simply 
cannot defeat what is already a public road. 
1986 Blockage 
Plaintiff testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the road for a 
period of several days. Plaintiff thereafter testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle 
out of the road. Again, under the case law set forth above, this was not a sufficient 
blockage to defeat the uninterrupted use of the road. And as set forth above with respect 
to the dead aspen trees, even if this Court considered it such, the road in question already 
has more than a ten-year period of uninterrupted use. The nature of this blockage 
therefore must be so substantial and of such duration that it will defeat what has already 
become a public thoroughfare-pulling a car across the road for a few days is simply not 
sufficient to defeat what already is a public road. 
Conclusion 
The trial court clearly erred in finding Plaintiffs testimony sufficient to support an 
interrupted use of the road. This is especially true with respect to the Garkane Power 
trenching, but is also true with respect to the dead aspen trees and the short duration 
blockage by an antique vehicle. The trial court's findings and conclusions on this issue, 
sparse as they may be, are contrary to law. This Court should therefore reverse the trial 
court's conclusions in this regard and issue and opinion that the road in question became 
and remained a public road despite any blockage attempts. 
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POINT V 
ARE THFC TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS 
CONCLUSION OF LAW SUFFICIENTLY 
DETAILED TO SUPPORT ITS ULTIMATE 
DECISION THAT THERE WAS A LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT BLOCKING OF THE ROAD AND 
THAT THE ROAD WAS NOT A PUBLIC 
THOROUGHFARE? 
The question of the adequacy or sufficiency of the Court's Findings of Fact is 
reviewed for correctness. Sde, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); 
Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 
474, 477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App 1991). In this 
case the Court did not make any specific findings with respect to the blockage of the road. 
This is a critical error on the part of the Court because the nature and number of alleged 
blockages are critical in determining whether there actually was a blockage, as a matter 
of law-this is the heart and soul of this case. And, in fact, the Court is required to make 
clear and concise findings of fact to support its conclusions which in this case it has not. 
In fact, in this case, the Court made only the following findings with respect to the 
blockage: 
36. During the 1970'b and 1980's, plaintiff on several occasions undertook efforts 
to block access to the road, sometimes with logs, sometimes with vehicles 
and by reliance upon trenching (of which the plaintiff was not aware) 
undertaken by others and sometimes by personal notice. Some of plaintiffs 
[sic] blocking efforts resulted in confrontations with would-be users where 
plaintiffs made clear their opposition to continued use. 
37. Plaintiffs' blocking efforts were not exhaustive but neither was the amount of 
use. . . . 
39. Pine Meadows' 
to block access 
permanent and 
kgent, Bill Pringle, was somewhat aware of plaintiffs' effort 
^nd use over the years, and had a clear memory of the more 
extensive effort during the 1990's [This is actually not 
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accurate-Mr. Pringle testified that he had no knowledge of any blockage until 
the mid-1960s (R. 347: Pages 189-191)]. 
43. The permanent type devices installed by plaintiffs to block access to the road 
were physically removed on more than one occasion. Plaintiffs continued to 
use the cabin only for recreation use and were not present when removed. 
44. At no time between the time of contracting to purchase Lots 38 and 39 and 
the filing of this law suit was there a ten-year period of uninterrupted use of 
the disputed road by members of the public. 
Based on these findings the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had adequately blocked 
the road and that there never was an uninterrupted ten-year period of use. The trial court 
then went on to make the following conclusion, presumably based upon the above findings: 
The evidence laid before the Court by defendants was less 
than "clear and convincing". Defendants called several 
persons that testified of the use over a couple of decades 
before being completely blocked out, but for the most part this 
was use by neighboring lot-owners, or those who provided 
services to them; and the absence of extensive development, 
particularly during the early years, limited the nature and 
opportunity for conflict and also reduced the occurrences 
where plaintiffs' efforts to blockade coincided with others' 
efforts to use. But some confrontations did exist, sufficient to 
evidence plaintiffs' intent to exclude the public from 
uninterrupted use. Furthermore, the blockade devices 
employed by plaintiffs, including those that were of a 
permanent nature during the 1990's, were removed when 
plaintiffs were not around. 
(R. 347: Page 314). 
The problem here is that it is impossible to tell whether a ten year period of 
uninterrupted use truly existed. The trial court's findings and conclusions lack sufficient 
detail to allow this Court any meaningful appellate review on this issue. See Michele 
Mciver Bell v. Harold Freeman Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (1991); (the trial court will not disturb a 
trial court's ruling... .as long as the court "exercises its discretion within the bounds and 
under the standards we have set and has supported its decision with adequate findings 
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both sides. The question, anq 
blocks actually occurred and 
and conclusions."). See also,\Paul Edward Roberts v. Sheri Lynn Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 
(1992). This is perplexing because there was testimony by Plaintiff about his specific 
attempts to block the road and testimony by a multitude of defense witnesses indicating 
that they were not aware of any blockages until the middle of the 90's when their use of the 
road was first disturbed. However, the Court glossed over the testimony on this issue from 
this is a critical and dispositive question, which if any of the 
which, if any of the blocks were adequate to provide the 
necessary notice. The Court failed miserably on both accounts of providing this mandatory 
information. Furthermore, the Trial Court could not have made appropriate findings even 
if it wanted to. Plaintiff, James R. Wilhelm, testified that he attempted to block the road, 
or at least the road was blocked, on the following occasions: 
1. Plaintiff testified that iih 1973-74 the road was temporarily blocked by Garkane 
Power, and/or its agents, who dug a trench across the road for the purpose of 
installing underground power lines to supply power to lot owners in the subdivision. 
(R. 347: Pages 50, 78). The trench was approximately 4 feet deep, 18 inches 
across. (R. 347: Pagefe 78, 82, 127).9 
2. Plaintiff further testified that on Memorial Day Weekend in 1980, he blocked the 
road at the top of Lot 38 with dead aspen trees. (R. 347: Pages 40, 49). Plaintiff' 
further testified that in June of 1980 he drove the road and there were no aspen 
trees blocking the road. (R. 347: Page 49).10 
3. Plaintiff also testified that in 1986, he pulled a 1959 Oldsmobile across the road for 
a period of a few dayp over memorial weekend. (R. 347: Page 53). Plaintiff' 
9
 As set forth below, the 
efforts of Plaintiffs to block the 
therefrom. This is patently absurd 
Plaintiffs' efforts and furthermoile 
exclude the public therefrom. A 
ten-year period of uninterrupted 
examine the individual blockag< 
fcourt allowed this blocking to somehow be imputed to the 
i[oad and as a manifestation of their efforts to exclude the public 
and contrary to the law. This blockage had nothing to do with 
could not be considered a manifestation of their desire to 
so, as argued below, without this blockage there clearly was a 
jise. This is why it is so critical that this Court be able to 
which the Trial Court utterly failed to identify. *es 
10
 As also set forth belo^, 
consider a blocking adequate for 
blockage was not of such a natur^ 
, the blockage must be of a permanent nature before the law will 
the purposes asserted by Plaintiffs. This particular alleged 
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thereafter testified that when he left he pulled said vehicle out of the road. (R. 347: 
Page 55). 
4. Plaintiff further testified that in 1993 he pulled construction material across the road 
in an attempt to block the same. (R. 347: Page 59).11 
The Trial Court failed to specifically identify when and how long each of these 
alleged blockages existed, if at all. The Trial Court merely glossed this whole important 
and dispositive issue over, and ignored the legal ramifications of each alleged blockage by 
lumping all the blockages together and indicating that they occurred "[d]uring the 1970fs 
and 1980's." This Court should overturn the ruling of the Trial Court on this failure alone. 
Stated differently, the Trial Court is not allowed to make findings and conclusions that are 
unsupported by the evidence as it has done in this case. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS 
NOT A TEN-YEAR UNINTERRUPTED PERIOD 
OF USE OF THE ROAD AND THAT THE ROAD 
WAS THEREFORE NOT A PUBLIC 
THOROUGHFARE 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2000) provides that 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years. 
Historically, in order for a private road to become a public thoroughfare there must have 
been evidence of intent by the owner to dedicate the road to a public use and an 
11
 As set forth below, Defendants are not challenging the sufficiency of the blockages 
after 1990. The question of the actual or adequacy of the blockages in the 1970s and 1980s 
however goes to the heart of the Trial Court's findings and conclusions with respect to the 
existence of lack of existence of a ten-year uninterrupted period of use. 
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acceptance by the public. Gmmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d 426 (Utah 1964). In the last 20 
years, however, the Utah Supreme Court has changed the historical rule and stated that 
the test is only whether a roadway has been continuously used by members of the general 
public for at least ten years and that it is no longer necessary to examine the intent of the 
owner. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447,449 (Utah 1981); see also Kohlerv. Martin, 916 
P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1996) (ruling that when a roadway has been continuously used by the 
general public for a period greater than ten years, it is impliedly dedicated to the public as 
a public highway). 
The Utah Supreme Cburt has also provided guidance as to what constitutes 
"continuous use" for purposes of determining use over a ten-year period: 
A use need not be "regular" or "constant" in order to be 
"continuous." All that is necessary is that the use be as often 
as required by ?he nature of the use and the needs of the 
claimant. 
Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 106^, 1064 (Utah 1984) (citing Richards v. Pine Ranch, Inc., 559 
P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977)). 
Uncontradicted testimony before the Trial Court indicated that the Wilhelm Road 
had been used and used often for numerous purposes and by numerous people from the 
mid-1960s to the early to md-1990s when it was permanently blocked. The critical 
question then becomes whether there was ten-year period of uninterrupted use which 
devolves squarely upon the subsidiary question of whether there was a blockage of the 
road that was sufficient as ^ matter of law that interfered with a ten-year period of 
uninterrupted use. 
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There must be an actual interference with the public's use of the road by means of 
erecting physical obstacles or otherwise by the use of the servient parcel in such a way as 
to prevent the adverse use. It is not sufficient to attempt an interruption. Margoline v. 
Hotel'elder, 218 A.2d 227,228 (Pa. 1966) (holding that blockage of a driveway for two days 
did not constitute actual interruption when there was no evidence of attempted use during 
the blockage). 
POINT VII 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FAILING TO 
CONSIDER ALL EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO 
THE EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC 
THOROUGHFARE INCLUDING EVIDENCE 
PRIOR, DURING AND/OR AFTER THE 
WARRANTY DEEDS WERE EXECUTED BY 
DEFENDANT. 
The trial court entered a Ruling on Summary Judgment Motions on or about March 
8,1999 ruling or holding that by virtue of Defendant executing a Warranty Deed, Defendant 
was precluded from claiming the existence of a roadway which pre-dates the conveyance. 
(R. 165) Presumably such ruling came from the cases cited by Plaintiff, to wit: Jones v. 
Grow Inv. & Management Company, 358 P.2d 909 11 Ut.2d 326 (Utah 1961) and Brauer-
Harrison Inc. v. Comby, 799 P.2d 716 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). Both of the cases cited by 
Plaintiff were cases dealing with a private easement or the assertion of a private easement. 
In Plaintiff's motion only the findings of each case was cited and dicta denoting a different 
finding under dissimilar circumstances was never introduced to the court; that is, that under 
certain situations, an assertion of the existence of a public road by one who formerly 
executed a Warranty Deed may be admissible. Jones specifically states that: 
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"if the deed contain^ anything which would indicate that a known 
encumbrance was not intended to be within the covenant, the purchaser 
cannot claim that such an encumbrance was a breach of covenant. 
However, with the possible exception of public easements that are 
apparent and in their nature permanent and irremediable, [emphasis 
added], mere knowledge of the encumbrance is not sufficient to exclude it 
from the operation of the covenant. The intention to exclude an 
encumbrance should be manifested in the deed itself, for a resort to oral or 
other extraneous evidence would violate several principles of law in regard 
to deeds." 
This additional language clearlly indicates that the court is permitted to consider evidence 
prior to the issuance of the warranty deed when that evidence is utilized for the purpose 
of asserting that a public roadway was apparent, permanent and irremediable. Interesting 
enough, in Judge Crockett's concurring opinion, he stated that "If the easement is of such 
a character and use is open and notorious, and the purchaser knows of its existence, he 
should not be permitted to accept the conveyance and then claim breach of covenant with 
respect to something about which he had full knowledge." Id. at 912. 
It has been one of Defendants' primary contentions that the roadway in dispute is 
a public roadway and has been used by the public for more than 25 years, has not been 
blocked and was apparent at ihe time Plaintiff purchased the property. Furthermore, the 
warranty deed contained language stating that the conveyance was "subject to: covenants, 
conditions, restrictions, reservations, rights of way and easement of record' (R. 347: Page 
85) If the public roadway existed at the time the deeds were executed, then the 
conveyance was subject to the public right of way and Plaintiff was put on notice of the 
same. Furthermore, even if the public road way had not been established for the 
prerequisite 10 year period, th s court should find that the execution of the Warranty Deeds 
did not foreclose public use o the road or toll the ten year period. Intuitively, by virtue of 
47 
the public thoroughfare doctrine, it is the public who adversely possesses the right of use 
and not a single individual. This Court should therefore overturn the Trial Court's ruling on 
the Summary Judgment motion and consider facts prior to the issuance of the Warranty 
Deed in determining whether a public thoroughfare had already been established by 
general public usage. In so doing, there is simply no question that there was considerably 
more than a ten-year period of uninterrupted use. 
POINT VIII 
DID THE COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT 
EXPIRED AND THE COURT COULD RELY 
UPON THE WARRANTY DEED TO PREVENT 
DEFENDANT FROM ASSERTING THE PUBLIC 
THOROUGHFARE DOCTRINE 
In the statutory warranty deed form, the operative language consists of the verbs 
signifying that the grantor "conveys and warrants" the property to the grantee. In using this 
language, the grantor not only conveys fee simple title ("together with all of the 
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging"), but does so with five statutory 
warranties, three of which are applicable, to wit: 
(1) That the grantor guarantees the grantee, and the grantee's heirs and 
assigns, in the quiet possession of the premises (covenant of quiet enjoyment); 
(2) That the premises are free from all encumbrances (covenant against 
encumbrances); and 
(3) that the grantor, and the grantor's heirs and personal representatives, will 
forever warrant and defend the title of the premises in the grantee and the grantee's 
heirs and assigns against all lawful claims (covenant of warranty). 
48 
Covenant (1) is a present covenant, because it was allegedly violated, at the 
moment the warranty deed became effective and the statute of limitations began to run 
from the time of the conveyance. Covenants (2) and (3) are future covenants, because 
they are violated, if at all, only at some time in the future, after the conveyance. For future 
covenants, the limitations period begins to run only after disturbance in title occurs. East 
Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co., 238 P.280 (Utah 1925). 
The scope of the warranties s also subject to restrictions on the property imposed by 
public statutes as in this case. If a road was already established or being established by 
the public, then the public could continue to utilize the property irrespective of private 
transactions occurring on the property until the property owner took affirmative action to 
prevent continued use of the road such as blocking the same. 
Even though the grantor (Defendant) agrees to warrant the property, it is not without 
limitation. This limitation is subject to the statute of limitations which commenced when 
Plaintiff Wilhelm viewed the d sturbance. Plaintiff admittedly saw the disturbance in the 
early 1970's. (R. 347: Page 35) Therefore, by the time this action was initiated the Statute 
of Limitations had long-since lapsed and the Trial Courts reliance on the same to protect 
Plaintiffs is misplaced. In the Courts Conclusion of Law, (the trial court did not number its 
conclusions of law but instead opted to make them in a narrative manner. Appellants 
therefore refer to the conclusiqns by paragraph number so as to aid this Court in its review 
of the conclusions),it states: 
1. Paragraph 1 
Moreover, Pine Meadows' conveyance by warranty deed carried 
with it the statutory guarantee of "quiet possession" and "that the premises 
are free from all encumbrances" and that Pine Meadows would "forever 
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warrant and defend the title . . . against all lawful claims whatsoever." UCA 
§57-1-12. Under the facts of this case, these defendants are precluded from 
asserting that a public thoroughfare existed when the plats were recorded 
in 1968 and 1969 and when the deeds were issued to plaintiffs in 1972 and 
1975; and this is so even if the proof were sufficient to establish a pre-
existing "public thoroughfare" which the Court concludes it is not. 
While such an conclusion may be true had this action been brought within the Statute of 
Limitations period, it was not. Plaintiffs had six years from the time they discovered the 
existence of the road to commence an action for Breach of Warranty of Title against 
Defendants which would have lapsed no later than January 6th, 1978 for Lot 39 and 
September 25th, 1981 for Lot 38. As previously stated, Plaintiffs commenced the lawsuit 
on or about October 23,1996 and are therefore barred by the Statute of Limitations from 
a seeking the warranty protection inappropriately afforded by the Trial Court in its 
conclusions. Therefore, this court should consider all testimony in determining whether the 
road was utilized by the public from the date of its inception or at least until 1960 to the first 
time Plaintiffs successfully blocked the road to determine if the general public had a ten 
year period of uninterrupted use, and if this court should so find, then it should reverse the 
Trial Court and find that the road has been abandoned to public usage. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the road should be deemed as a public road 
or the matter should be remanded back to the Court for further findings. 
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ADDENDUM 
72-5-103 TRANSPORTATION CODE 260 
(4) adequate drainage in connection with any highway, cut, fill, or 
channel change and the maintenance of any highway, cut, fill, or channel 
change; 
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage buildings and yards, and 
road maintenance or construction sites; 
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufacture of road materials, and 
access roads to the sites; 
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view of any portion of a 
highway to promote the safety of the traveling public; 
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional signs, and other signs, 
fences, curbs, barriers, and obstructions for the convenience of the 
traveling public; 
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm sewers, sidewalks, and 
highway illumination; 
(10) the construction and maintenance of livestock highways; and 
(11) the construction and maintenance of roadside rest areas adjacent 
to or near any highway. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 96; 1991, ch. 27-12-96, and in the introductory paragraph, 
137, § 24,27-12-96; renumbered by L. 1998, made stylistic changes and deleted the first 
ch. 270, § 130, sentence concerning the manner in which the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- department may acquire real property neces-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered sary for future state highway purposes, 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
2-5-103. Acquisition of rights-of-way and other real 
property — Title to property acquired. 
(1) The department may acquire any real property or interests in real 
property necessary for temporary, present, or reasonable future state highway 
purposes by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise. 
(2) (a) Title to real property acquired by the department or the counties, 
cities, and towns by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, 
or otherwise for highway rights-of-way or other highway purposes may be 
in fee simple or any lesser estate or interest. 
(b) If the highway is a county road, city street under joint title as 
provided in Subsection 72-3-104(3), or right-of-way described in Title 72, 
Chapter 5, Part 3, Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act, title to all 
interests in real property less than fee simple held under this section is 
held jointly by the state and the county, city, or town holding the interest. 
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the 
public has only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 101; 1991, ch. 27-12-101, and added new Subsection (1), mak-
137, § 29, 27-12-101; renumbered by L. ing related changes in subsection designation. 
1998, ch. 270, § 131; 2000, ch. 324, § 6. The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- 2000, added Subsection (2Kb), making a related 
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered change, 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication — Scope. 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it 
has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years. 
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261 RIGHTS-OF-WAY 72-5-106 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the 
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary 
to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 89, 27-12-89; 
renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 132; 
2000, ch. 324, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-89. 
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 
2000, substituted "is" for "shall be deemed to 
have been" in Subsection (1) and added Subsec-
tions (2) and (3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence. 
Generally. 
Private rights. 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication. 
Width of roadway. 
Evidence. 
Evidence showing, among other things, that 
roadway was used continuously for recreational 
and agricultural purposes and for access to 
other business activities supported the trial 
court's ruling that the roadway was dedicated 
or abandoned to the public. Kohler v. Martin, 
916 R2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Generally. 
Where all three elements under this section 
for the establishment of a public highway were 
satisfied, the court had no discretion to ignore 
that fact and erred in concluding that a road 
was not a public highway. Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). 
Private rights. 
Creation of a private right in a public thor-
oughfare cannot occur; a prescriptive right is in 
conflict with the dedication of land to the use of 
the general public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 
910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication. 
Because there were material issues of fact as 
to whether people using a road were members 
of the general public or landowners in the area, 
who had either a private right or permission to 
use the road, and there were conflicting state-
ments as to public use of the road for recre-
ational purposes, summary judgment in favor 
of the proponents of dedication was erroneous. 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 
1097 (Utah 1995). 
Finding that a road was not a public thor-
oughfare was proper based on evidence that the 
road was generally used only during the deer 
hunting season and was frequently closed to 
the public at other times, and that its use 
during the hunting season was by permission of 
the owners. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 
P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Width of roadway. 
Generally, the width of a public road is deter-
mined according to what is reasonable and 
necessary under all the facts and circum-
stances. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
72-5-105. Highways once established continue until aban-
doned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until 
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction 
over any highway, or by other competent authority. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 90, 27-12-90; 
renumbered by L* 1998, ch. 270, § 133. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-90, and made a stylistic change. 
72-5-106. Expiration of franchise of toll bridge or road. 
If the franchise of any toll bridge or road expires by limitation, forfeiture, or 
nonuser it is a free public highway, and no claim shall be valid against the 
public for right-of-way or for land or material comprising the bridge or road. 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-12 
Ed. 1198 (1919), appeal dismissed, 254 U.S. name of claim and survey number, he was 
616, 41 S. Ct. 147, 65 L. Ed. 440 (1920). estopped from making any claim to property 
_ described in deed when he subsequently ac-
—Title conveyed.
 m r e d t l t l e iheret0m W a U v# U t a h Copper Co., 
Under this section, one who conveys coal
 2 ? ? R 5 5 ( 8 t h C i r 1 9 2 1 ) 
lands before he has applied to the government 
to purchase the same conveys a good title Cited m Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. 
thereto. Ketchum Coal Co. v Pleasant Valley Bank, 723 P2d 398 (Utah 1986); Utah Farm 
Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917). p ^ Credit Assoc, v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 
Where grantor purporting to convey title to 994 (Utah 1987). 
mining claims described them m his deed by 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am Jur. 2d Deeds ability insurance, as covering, m absence of 
§§ 341, 342. express provision, after-acquired premises or 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 105. realty, or subsequent additions to described 
AX.R. — Property insurance, or public li- realty, 18 A L.R 3d 795. 
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey. 
Any person claiming title to any real estate may, notwithstanding there may 
be an adverse possession thereof, sell and convey his interest therein in the 
same manner and with the same effect as if he were in the actual possession 
thereof. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1980; 
C.L. 1917, § 4880; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-
10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Mainte-
nance §§ 15, 16. 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect. 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to (insert name), 
grantee, of (insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this (month/day/year). 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and privileges 
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs, and personal 
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good 
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and 
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all 
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs, and personal representatives 
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will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs, and 
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to these cov-
enants may be briefly inserted in the deed following the description of the land. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981; 
C.L. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-
11; L. 2000, ch. 75, § 20. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
line in the waranty deed form and made stylis-
tic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Actions for breach of warranty. 
—Irremediable easement. 
Appurtenances. 
—Parol evidence. 
—Water rights. 
Covenant against encumbrances. 
—Waiver. 
Covenants running with land. 
Determination of character of instrument. 
"Encumbrances" construed. 
Formal requirements. 
—Presumptions. 
—Signature of witness. 
Interest conveyed. 
Liability of grantor. 
—Materialman's lien. 
Limitation of actions. 
Vendor's lien. 
Way of necessity. 
Cited. 
Actions for breach of warranty. 
Where paramount title is in sovereign, pur-
chaser may yield to that title, and such yielding 
constitutes constructive eviction which will 
support action on covenant of warranty. East 
Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber 
Counties Canal Co., 65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280 
(1925). 
In an action by a grantee against his grantor 
for breach of warranty because in a quiet title 
action between the grantor and a third person, 
the title was quieted in the third person, the 
grantor cannot assert the defense that because 
the third party had filed no lis pendens the 
grantee was not bound by the earlier decree. 
Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d 538 
(1953). 
—Irremediable easement. 
In a rescission action for anticipatory repu-
diation of a real estate contract, summary judg-
ment in buyers' favor was authorized, because 
an irremediable easement was not excepted 
from the property description in the contract. 
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 R2d 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Appurtenances. 
On severance of estate by sale of part thereof, 
all easements of permanent character that 
have been created in favor of land sold, and 
which are open and plain to be seen, and are 
reasonably necessary for its use and convenient 
enjoyment, unless expressly reserved by grant-
ees, pass as appurtenances to land; cement 
walk constructed in front of several lots which 
was used as easement in connection with use 
and occupation of lots passed as an appurte-
nance to lots on sale thereof. Rollo v. Nelson, 34 
Utah 116, 96 P. 263, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 315 (1908). 
A warranty deed conveys the fee simple title 
"together with all the appurtenances, rights 
and privileges thereunto belonging," by force of 
this section, unless some rights are reserved by 
the terms of the conveyance. Accordingly, deed 
conveyed prescriptive right to conduct water 
through ditch along the right of way without 
any mention of such right, because such ease-
ment for an appurtenant water right is an 
appurtenance to the land. Petrofesa v. Denver 
& R.G.W.R.R., 110 Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808 
(1946). 
—Parol evidence. 
Where there was latent ambiguity as to the 
existence of a ditch and a right of way as an 
appurtenant to the land conveyed by a deed, 
parol evidence was admissible. Egelund v. 
Fayter, 51 Utah 579, 172 P. 313 (1918). 
Where^deed, while conveying appurtenances 
as matter of law, was silent as to just what 
appurtenances were, latent ambiguity existed 
which could be explained by parol testimony. 
Wade v. Dorius, 52 Utah 310,173 P. 564 (1918). 
Evidence is admissible to establish what was 
appurtenant to property under statutory form 
of deed, which has effect of passing all appur-
tenances to property, as not varying terms of 
written instrument. Adamson v. Brockbank, 
112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
—Water rights. 
Deed of general warranty of quiet and peace-
able possession does not warrant water rights 
unless they are appurtenant to land conveyed. 
George v. Robison, 23 Utah 79,63 P. 819 (1901). 
Covenant against encumbrances. 
Where defendant's deed to plaintiffs was in* 
the statutory form and excepted from the cov-
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES R. WILHELM and LINDA ROSE 
WILHELM, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PINE MEADOWS ESTATES, 
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation; 
MILTON R. FARNEY; MARVIN R. 
SHAPIRO; ROBERT C. DOLLEY, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' CLOSING ARGUMENT 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. 960600032 
Judge K. L. Mclff 
COMES NOW Defendants Milton R. Farney and Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, (hereinafter "Defendants") and do hereby enter their closing argument in support of 
their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously filed. This action was commenced by 
Plaintiffs James R. Wilhelm and Linda Rose Wilhelm (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") seeking an order 
from the Court requiring Defendants to close a road through Plaintiffs' property, pay damages for 
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closure of the road, and pay Plaintiffs attorney fees in prosecuting this action. At the time of the 
closing argument, Defendants requested an opportunity to submit its closing argument in writing 
because of time commitments later that evening. The Court indicated that it would accept 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that the Court had already made a determination 
that due to the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs were barred from claiming any damages against 
Defendants for the repair or cost of closure of the road. During opening statement, Plaintiffs' 
Counsel indicated that they were dropping any claim for attorney fees as the same was not 
provided because the law suit was between the Grantor, (Defendants), and Grantee, (Plaintiffs). 
The only remaining issue to be argued, therefore, was the type of continued use of the road and 
whether the road should be deemed as a public road. 
The only witness called by Plaintiffs was James R. Wilhelm. Defendants called seven (7) 
witnesses including Defendant Milton R. Farney. Two of Defendants' witnesses were the initial 
developers who worked intricately with the infrastructure development. The remaining five 
witnesses were a forest ranger who has never owned property in the area, the Moyers who were 
one of the first persons to purchase property in the area, but who have subsequently sold their 
property and no longer resided in the area, and three current property owners familiar with the 
road, Mr. Ronald Graham, Stan Grimwald and Buzzy Holts, all of whom still own property in 
the subdivision or adjacent subdivisions and who are familiar with the roads because of their 
frequent travel of the same. Each of the property owners reside in various parts of the subdivision 
and utilized the road for multiple purposes on a frequent basis, not by means of compulsion, but 
by pleasure and without the consent of Plaintiffs. 
Mr. Pringle, the developer of the subdivision roads who was not named as a Defendant, 
was called because of his testimony regarding his frequent use of the road on a daily basis since 
the subdivision was developed. Testimony was that he used the road every day and hundreds of 
times each summer for ingress and egress and for showing lots to perspective buyers. He further 
testified that the road was initially graded to a width of 12-15 feet (big enough for two vehicles 
to pass each other) and that the road was definitely roughed in at the time Plaintiff purchased the 
lots. Significantly, Mr. Pringle stated that they tried to follow old roads as much as possible to 
leave the natural terrain undisturbed. While he could not recall that the road existed in this 
particular area, Mr. Farney confirmed that the Wilhelm road was graded in 1965-66 along a pre-
existing road. 
Paul Fullmer, who is the current Cedar Mountain fire chief and prior Dixie National Forest 
Ranger, worked in the area for well over 40 years was called because of the following: (1) his 
familiarity with the area, (2) his use of the road to access forest land by the government, (3) his 
knowledge of use of the road by numerous members of the public as a personal witness to the 
same, (4) he was the individual who obtained from his office the 1967 and 1976 photographs and 
was familiar with how to read them, (5) his knowledge as to the current necessity of the road, and 
(6) an individual who was a disinterested party who had nothing to gain by his testimony. He 
testified that he had used the road while working for the forest service and that it was his belief 
that the road had been used by logging companies as well as a personal witness to its use by 
hunters, strangers, campers and other individuals who were accessing the forest land beyond 
Plaintiffs' property. The logging commenced in the early 1960s for only a few years. He further 
testified that the road was important and was deemed by the public as a necessary second access 
off the mountain in case of fire. 
The Moyers were called to testify because they were one of the first people to purchase 
property in the area, had lived in the area full time for numerous years during applicable times 
of blockage, had utilized the road on a semi-regular basis and had sold their cabin several years 
previous, once again, as witnesses with no ulterior motives or personal interest. Each of the 
witnesses were familiar with the road and did testify to its existence prior to Wilhelm's purchase 
of the property and that no blocking of the road occurred prior to 1993. 
At trial, numerous exhibits were presented and stipulated to by both parties. Among these 
exhibits, the most probative being areal photographs presented by both the Plaintiffs and 
Defendants, ranging from 1960 to 1976, which provided significant support and clarity with 
regard to the existence of the road. There can be no doubt that road existed and had been 
significantly improved when comparing the 1967 photograph with the 1960 photograph. Even 
more compelling than oral testimony is a comparison of the areal photographs from 1967 and 1976 
which, when studied side by side, show clearly that the road was obviously present and appears 
to be of the same approximate width, extent and nature at the same location. This evidence 
clearly shows that a road was there prior to Plaintiffs' purchase of the property in 1968, yet 
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Plaintiffs' testimony was adamant that there was no road through the property when he walked 
the property on the date he decided to purchase the same. Interestingly enough, Plaintiff James 
R. Wilhelm does recall seeing some tracks going through the property but that these tracks had 
only bent the grass over and did not appear to be significant. He also testified to a large berm 
which no other witness verified and, in fact, disputed. Defendants are left to wonder, after 
viewing the evidence, how one could remember minor tracks through the grass and yet fail to 
recognize that the a roughed-in road existed of at least 12 feet in width as testified by all of the 
witnesses questioned, a fact which Plaintiff denied on rebuttal testimony, even then, after viewing 
the photographs and hearing the testimony. Defendants assert that this Court should reconsider 
the self-serving testimony of Plaintiff James R. Wilhelm under the circumstance of this irrefutable 
testimony which clearly supports the testimony of seven witness against the self-serving testimony 
of one witness, the Plaintiff. 
Witnesses Moyer and Grimwald both testified that they purchased the property in the 1967 
and that they both utilized that road to explore the country, to gather firewood, and for access to 
the upper forest area. Neither party saw any blockade until 1993 when Plaintiff stretched a cable 
chain across the road to impede travel. Interestingly, the parties were notified of that blockage 
and went to look at the same, out of curiosity and surprise. Each wondered how the Plaintiff 
could block the road, as they believed it was public road and had been opened to access for well 
over 25 years. Stan Grimwald was the water truck driver from the mid 1980's and he never saw 
a blockage even though he traveled the road regularly to deliver water. 
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Mr. Grimwald, another forest ranger, testified that he traveled the road in 1968 and that 
he was on the mountain during all holidays and tried to be there every other weekend. He 
indicated that he utilized the road to access the forest property on top of the mountain and had no 
doubt that the road existed. He also provided his own professional opinion that a two-track road 
existed in the 1960 photograph which could be seen by looking through the spectrograph. 
Likewise, Mr. Fullmer testified that, upon looking at the 1960 photos, while he could not be 
absolutely certain, he believed that the spectrograph showed the existence of a road over the 
Wilhelm property in the 1960s photograph. Both of these individuals had utilized these types of 
photographs on a frequent basis through their profession and were accustomed to examination of 
this type of evidence. Each could be considered an expert witnesses with regard to examining 
these types of photographs as it was a part of their professional work. 
Mr. Pringle also presented a very interesting perspective as to his knowledge that the road 
had never been blocked prior to 1993. Counsel for Plaintiff, on numerous occasions tried to 
contradict and persuade Mr. Pringle to admit that no road existed at the time that Plaintiffs 
purchased the property. It is also interesting to note that as he was being examined by 
Defendants' counsel, that he often utilized the "Clinton Defense" by failing to recall the actual 
condition of the road in 1967 and from that time forward. However, even under the examination 
of both counsel, Mr. Pringle did not waiver on the fact that he lived in the area and that he 
utilized that road on a daily basis and, in his own words, hundreds of times each summer and 
never observed the road blocked until 1993. This is direct contradiction to testimony by Plaintiff 
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which indicated that he had blocked the road in 1973 through 1974, a period indicated somewhere 
in the neighborhood of one year. Surely, if Plaintiff had, indeed, blocked the road for a period 
of one year, witnesses would have remembered. Furthermore, even Plaintiff admitted that the 
intended digging of the line in 1973 and 1974 by GarKane Power was for the purpose of running 
the line only and was not intended to block the road. Obviously, if the trenching of the road was 
intended to install a power line, then the blocking of the road during that period does not 
constitute a blockade sufficient to interrupt the use of the road by the general public. 
Furthermore, it is important to notice that none of the witnesses who utilize the road every 
summer, many of whom live there during the entire summer, ever witnessed the road blocked 
during a year-long period. Obviously, if such had been the case, they would have remembered 
the road being blocked in 1973 through 1974, 1980, and 1986 as they all came to view the 
blocked road in 1993. Also, how many witnesses must Defendants call to satisfy the coincidences 
that all of them missed the blockage each time at the same time. Defendants submit that enough 
witnesses have proven that Plaintiffs did not block the road until 1993. 
Finally, the testimony of Ronnie Graham lends additional weight to the open existence of 
the road until 1993. It is interesting to note that on both 1973 and 1980, certain memorable events 
occurred in Mr. Graham's life which lends weight to his knowledge that the road was open during 
the years that Plaintiff claims they were blocked. In 1973, Mr. Graham received his first motor 
scooter and proceeded to "ride it all over the place" including up and down the Wilhelm road. 
Mr. Graham noted that the Wilhelm road was a special attraction because it was steep, fun to ride 
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the motorcycle on, and that he rode it on a daily basis and never recalled seeing the road blocked 
for any extended period of time. Obviously, in 1973 and 1974, an 18" deep trench would not 
block a motor scooter from riding up and down the road and, in fact, might provide an added bit 
of fun in jumping over the dirt pile. In 1980, when Plaintiff asserts that he blocked the road for 
a period of time with a fallen tree, Mr. Graham testified that he got his XR-125 and that, once 
again, he road all over the mountain, including the Wilhelm road, during the entire summer. He 
also testified that at that time, while Plaintiffs were there, his sister babysat the Wilhelm children 
during the summer and, in fact, he and his parents used the road to travel to the Wilhelm cabin 
to check on the children until Plaintiffs' returned at 3:00-4:00 a.m. It seems unreasonable and 
obviously would have been an impact upon any party if they had been required to stop because 
of the blockade and climb over the same to approach Plaintiffs' cabin in the early hours of the 
morning. Likewise, Mr. Pringle would have certainly remembered an inability to travel the road 
in 1980 if the same had been blocked by a tree. 
In 1986, Plaintiff again claims to have blocked the road with a vehicle. At that time, Mr. 
Wilhelm had confrontations with several witnesses regarding the blockage of the road by the car 
and, yet, Mr. Wilhelm never called any witness to verify this assertion. Surely, if landowners 
in the area were so up in arms that they are "patting their guns" and threatened to move the car 
with a tractor, this would have been a memorable experience to any witness. Coincidently, the 
two witnesses that he supposedly had these conversations with are now deceased. Furthermore, 
when blocking of the road did actually occur in 1993, it did, in fact, create a disturbance of which 
everyone was aware. Even those who do not live within the subdivision came to look at the road. 
This natural human reaction, without additional testimony, is compelling and clearly convincing 
of the fact that had Plaintiff effectively blocked the road prior to that time, it would have been 
brought to the attention of everyone and would have been a memorable experience to which all 
memories would have been able to draw upon. Interesting enough, the very time that he blocked 
the road in 1986 was during the weekend when Plaintiff testified that the "motorcycle races" 
occurred and yet no one, including Ron Graham a motorcycle enthusiast, can recall. Would not 
people have complained had Plaintiff interrupted their fun? 
In summation, the overwhelming testimony of all witnesses called at the time of trial, 
including that of Plaintiff, is that in 1973 and 1974, the road was not blocked. The only impact 
upon the road was the digging of the trench to install the power line, which did not impede travel 
or effectively block the road. The overwhelming testimony regarding any blockage in 1980 
concludes that the road was not blocked. Only Plaintiff himself testified that the road was blocked 
during this time. The other witnesses testified that it had not been blocked. However, even if the 
Court does find that the road was blocked based on Plaintiffs lone testimony, Plaintiff did admit 
that the blockage was not effective as the same was immediately removed and he did not further 
act to protect the road at that time. 
Likewise, in 1986, none of the witnesses recall any car being used to block the road. 
However, even if Plaintiff did utilize a vehicle to block the road, Defendants assert that the same 
was not effective, in manner or means, as it did not provide adequate notice to those adverse 
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possessors who were utilizing the road that the road was intended to be blocked. Numerous 
witnesses testified that at various times and in various manners, cars blocked the road for a period 
of time. On occasions when these cars blocked the road it was impassible and at other times it 
was not. Defendants assert that it was necessary for Plaintiff to utilize some other means of 
blocking the road other than placing a car in the middle of the road without further notification 
such as a sign or other means to establish that the road was intentionally being blocked to 
deliberately prevent travel. 
On several occasions, Plaintiffs indicated that they blocked the road on one end of the 
property. Obviously, the blocking of that road was on the upper end of the property as a general 
rule or by Plaintiffs cabin excepting the alleged blocking of by the car. Witnesses Pringle, 
Graham and Farney testified that they were utilizing the road on a daily basis during that time. 
Defendants contend that if someone were utilizing a steep, semi-narrow road, and had traveled 
up or down the road for a significant distance, roughly a 1,000 feet in length, and then was 
required to back up or down the road for almost of the entire distance of the road because it was 
blocked, it is highly doubtful that the witnesses would have forgotten this incident. They certainly 
didn't forget the 1993 incident which occurred over seven years ago. 
Defendants do not dispute that from 1993 to the present, Plaintiff utilized numerous and 
varied means of blocking the road. These were all acknowledged and admitted by all of the 
parties. They also assert that the blocking caused such a scene, it was brought to the attention of 
the other property owners in the subdivision. Defendants concede that this was an effective 
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blocking of the road and, from that time forth, Plaintiff effectively blocked the road on various 
occasions. This, however, was too little, too late as the road had already been established as a 
public road. This is further evidenced by Kane County maintaining the road during the 1990s and 
before. If it was not a public road, why did Kane County place signs at the end of the road and 
maintain and improve the road to County standards? Why did Sheriff Kitchen issue Plaintiff a 
ticket for blocking the road? The answer is obvious, it was and has been for years considered a 
public road by all but the Plaintiffs. 
The matter presently before the Court has an interesting nuance, which no other trial court 
specifically has addressed; being that Plaintiff is the one asserting that the road running through 
his property has not been designated as a public road and, therefore, is seeking the Court to 
compel Defendants to close the roads. Because Plaintiffs are the moving parties in this matter, 
they generally have the burden of proof to show, by preponderance of the evidence, that the road 
was not a public road. Plaintiff failed to meet that burden of proof and Defendants clearly and 
convincingly have shown that the road has been open to the public for over 30 years. There can 
be no doubt that the road was open to the public in that numerous parties, both residing within and 
without the subdivision, and including governmental entities utilized, maintained and traveled the 
road at their own pleasure and convenience. The testimony was abundantly clear that between 
1960 and 1980, the road was never intentionally blocked by Plaintiffs or anyone else. This alone 
is sufficient time to establish the ten year minimum for public roads. Because Plaintiffs are the 
parties seeking to close the road, as against the entire public and not just Defendants, the fact that 
the property was transferred by Defendant Pine Meadows Estates to Plaintiffs does not vitiate 
public use of the road prior to the transfer of the Deed, and the testimony was unrebutted that the 
road had been utilized by not only property owners but also by hunters, governmental employees, 
recreational users, county and federal workers, and the general public. Furthermore, the law was 
never intended to prevent a grantor from claiming that a road was open to the public because he 
transferred it to the grantee. If the road is open to the public and has been utilized by the public 
for a period of ten years, it automatically becomes a public road and, once open to the public, 
cannot be reclaimed by virtue of the fact that Grantor transferred the property to another upon 
which the public road exists. If this were so, then every road open and utilized by the public 
which was thereafter incorporated into a deed transferring the property from grantor to grantee 
would limit the public from claiming that the road had already existed. Furthermore, it would be 
foolish to prevent a grantor from rectifying his error as the burden then falls upon a third party 
to initiate an action to prevent closure of the road. Defendants assert that this would be against 
public policy. 
While it is admittedly a burden upon the servient estate to have a road traverse through the 
property, and while the law does not lightly allow the transfer of property from private to public 
use, it is not necessary to prove that the owner of a private road had intended to offer the road to 
the public under dedication by use statute, because the owner's intent may be inferred for mere 
acquiescence in allowing the public to utilize the road. Draper Citv v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 
P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995). Utah Code Ann. §72-5-1041 (1999) states that "a highway shall be 
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deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." This intent may be inferred 
from the declarations, acts or circumstances of use by the general public. Gilmore v. Carter. 391 
P.2d 426, 428 (Utah 1964). The evidence clearly shows that the road was open to the public and 
that the general public was never blocked from utilizing the road from at least 1965 to 1980 and 
Defendant argues from 1965 until 1993. Transfer of the property from one to another is irrelevant 
with regard to the public road doctrine because the evidence shows that the road has been 
continuously used, this Court should find, just as Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d, 910, Utah App. 
(1996) that the roadway has been continuously used by the general public for a period greater than 
ten years and is, thus, impliedly dedicated to the public as a public highway. 
In reviewing the evidence, "continuous use" is crucial in the determination of whether the 
road was, is or has become a public road. This Court recognizes that in consideration of both 
Crane v. Crane. 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984) and Memott v. Anderson. 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) 
the road need not be used in a "regular" or "constant" basis to be continuous but that it must be 
utilized as is necessary and is as often as required by the nature of the use and the needs of the 
claimants. Even though Plaintiffs erected some barriers from 1993 forward, if the road was 
public prior to these barriers being constructed, the barriers do not change the public nature of the 
road. Furthermore, in Memmott. that Court took judicial notice as to the purpose for which the 
road was originally constructed and in its final determination, relied upon "substantial" evidence 
to show that the road had been originally constructed under the protection of federal statute on 
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public lands by the ahands of the public". Testimony from a disinterested party indicates that 
there was a road access across the disputed area as early as 1966, for forest ranger and other 
public purposes and that while the road was subsequently expanded by Defendants in 1967 and 
thereafter minimally improved and expanded by Kane County in the late 1980's and early 19901 s, 
the road has existed in substantially the same manner in which it exists today for over 20 years. 
The evidence also is substantial from both parties that the interruptions by Plaintiffs, if at 
all prior to 1993, were minimal and did not substantially interrupt the use of the road. Even if 
accepting Plaintiffs testimony, because Plaintiffs did not adequately block the road sufficiently 
to warn and disrupt the use of the road, and to give adequate notice to the occupants of the road 
prior to 1993, the road must be deemed as a public road. In Thurman v. By ram. 626 P.2d 447, 
449 (Utah 1981), the party opposing the road sought to claim that the road was blocked during 
the movement of sheep and the Court, by specifically finding that a public road existed, clearly 
indicated that the temporary barricades were not sufficient to warrant a disruption to the public. 
Furthermore, in reviewing sister jurisdictions, this trial court finds that there must be an actual 
interference with claimant's use by means of erecting physical obstacles or otherwise use of the 
servient parcel in such a manner as to prevent adverse use. See Margoline v. Hole/elder, 420 
Pa. 544, 546, 218 A2d 227, 228 (1966) (blockade of driveway for two days did not constitute 
actual interruption when there was no evidence of attempted use.); Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249, 
251 n.2, 630 P.2d 545,547 n.2 (Ct. App. 1981) (stringing barbed wire across a roadway deemed 
insufficient to interrupt usage when barrier was knocked down one day later); South Norwalk 
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Lodge v. Palco Hats, Inc., 140 Conn. 370, 374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953) (claimant repeatedly 
removed barriers from right-of-way and continued use); King v. Corsini, 32 111. App. 3d 461, 
466, 335 NE.2d 561, 565 (1975) (acts by landowner blocking road for short periods did not 
interrupt public use). It is not sufficient to attempt an interruption or to render the use less 
convenient. The obstruction must, in fact, interfere with the claimant's usage. See Concerned 
Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 329 NC 37,54,404 SE.2d 
677, 687 (1991); Reed v. Piedimonte, 138 AD.2d 937, 937, 526 NYS.2d 273, 274 (1988) (no 
evidence that erection of temporary barriers "ever effectively interfered with, or disturbed, 
plaintiffs continuous use of the driveway"). Moreover, use of the land by the owner for the same 
purpose as the claimant does not constitute any interruption and mere protest by the owner, 
whether oral or written, will not interrupt an adverse usage as in Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 
894 (1937), the court stated that: 
To interrupt the continuity of the adverse occupant's possessions there must be 
a physical interruption of the adverse possession, or a suit or some unequivocal act 
of ownership which interrupts the exercise of the right claimed and being enjoyed 
by the adverse claimant. 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, p. 701, and cases cited. 
Such interruption of the adverse claimant's occupancy or user, to stop the running 
of the statute, must be of the same definite character as must the adverse claimant's 
occupancy or user, to stop the running of the statute, must be of the same definite 
character as must the adverse claimant's possession and user be to start the statute 
running. The interruption must be open, notorious, and under claim of right such 
as to manifest an intention to repossess the property and dispossess the occupant, 
and be a challenge to his right and dominion. It must bear on its face an 
unequivocal intention to take possession. 
To interrupt the continuity of the adverse occupant's possession, there must be a physical 
interruption of the adverse possession, or a suit or some unequivocal act of ownership which 
interrupts the exercise of the right claimed and being enjoyed by the adverse claimant. 2 C.J.S. 
Adverse P. 701, and cases cited. Such interruption of the adverse claimant's occupancy are used 
to stop the rendered statute, must be of the same definite character as much the adverse claimant's 
occupancy or use which was necessary to start the statute running. The interruption must be open, 
notorious, and under claim of right such as to manifest an intent to repossess the property and 
dispossess the occupant, and be a challenge to his right and dominion. It must bear on its face an 
unequivocal intention to take possession. This type of action simply did not occur based on both 
Plaintiffs and Defendant's testimony. 
Finally, this Court should find it persuasive that Kane County has treated the disputed road 
as a public road. As in, Feldker v. Crook, 567 NE.2d 1115, 1125 (1991) ("maintenance of a road 
by public authorities is a strong indication that the road is a public highway, and the converse of 
this proposition is a public highway . . ."), this Court finds that the Sheriffs intent to require the 
road to remain open, Kane County Road Department's maintenance and upkeep of the road, and 
Fire Chief of the Cedar Mountain Fire District assertion that the road is necessary to service the 
public, is pursuasive in determining that the disputed road has been abandoned to the public. See 
also Wilson v. Seminole Coal, Inc., 336 SE.2d 30, 31 (Wva. 1985) (construing statute to provide 
that a public road may be established by public use for statutory period accompanied by some 
recognition of such road by public authorities); Idaho Code §40-202 (1993) (requiring that roads 
used as highways ashall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public"). 
Based upon the foregoing, and the cumulative testimony of numerous witnesses, it is 
evident that Plaintiffs never sufficiently provided notice nor interrupted use of the road as a public 
road for the purposes stated above until 1993 and that Defendants Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law reflect the determination of this Court and an Order declaring that the road 
has been abandoned to the public and an Order reflecting the same is hereby ordered prepared by 
the Defendants. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of March, 2000. 
HIGBEE & JENSEN, P.C. 
JUStlN W. WXYMENT 
Attorney for Defendants 
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DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052 
JAMES R. WILHELM and LINDA ROSE 
WILHELM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PINE MEADOWS ESTATES, 
INCORPORATED, MILTON R. FARNEY; 
MARVIN R. SHAPIRO; ROBERT C. 
DOLLEY, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 960600032 
Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial on February 24,2000 before the 
Honorable K. L. Mclff, and Plaintiffs James R. Wilhelm and Linda Rose Wilhelm appearing by 
and through their attorney, L. Edward Robbins, and Defendants Milton R. Farney and Pine 
Meadows Estates, Inc., appearing by and through their attorneys of record, Justin W. Wayment 
and Blaine T. Hofeling. The Court previously granted partial summary judgment, but has been 
generous in allowing evidence and has reconsidered all issues and being fully advised in the 
premises does hereby adopt the following: 
* & 
<=> 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, Case number 960600032, Page 2 -
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1- Defendant, Pine Meadows Estates, Inc. (hereafter Pine Meadows) and plaintiff James R. 
Wilhelm entered into a real estate purchase contract on or about June 30, 1968. Under 
the contract, plaintiff purchased two lots identified as Lots 38 and 39 in the Strawberry 
Valley Estates Subdivision for the amount of $4,390. 
2- Pine Meadows is a closely held corporation with the other defendants being owners, 
officers and/or directors thereof. 
3- Lots 38 and 39 purchased by plaintiffs were part of Strawberry Valley Estates, Unit #2 
(hereafter "Strawberry") located along the slope of a hill in a mountainous area of Kane 
County. 
4- Immediately adjacent to Strawberry and essentially on top of the hill is another group of 
lots known as Ponderosa Villa Unit C (hereafter "Ponderosa"). There are other 
subdivision units developed by Pine Meadows in the immediate vicinity. 
5- Strawberry was approved by Kane County on Jan. 8, 1968 and recorded on May 10, 
1968. Ponderosa was approved by Kane County on Dec. 9,1968 and recorded on Feb. 
17,1969. 
6- Several lots in Ponderosa are back to back with Lots 38, 39 and 40 and the adjoining lots 
on either side in Strawberry. 
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7- The plats for Strawberry and Ponderosa are separate and neither reflect how the two plats 
fit together. 
8- Prior to recording any of the subdivision plats, and in the area encompassed by the same, 
there were several old unimproved one-vehicle-width roads that had been used by 
loggers, hunters, ranchers, forestry personnel and others. These old roads are barely 
visible on aerial photography dating to the early 1960's and supplied to the Court. The 
roads consisted essentially of tire tracks left over a period of time and appear not to 
follow a well-thought plan. 
9- One of the old roads crossed portions of Lots 38 and 39, purchased by plaintiffs from 
defendant Pine Meadows, and also crossed a corner of Lot 40. 
10- When Pine Meadows recorded its various subdivision plats, it surveyed and engineered 
roads to service the various lots, reflecting the roads on the recorded plats and dedicating 
them to the use of the public. The platted roads are forty feet (40f) in width, some four 
times the width of the old unimproved roads in the area. 
11- In some instances Pine Meadows platted roads which corresponded with some of the old 
logger/hunter roads and in some instances roads were platted in areas where no prior road 
of any nature had existed. 
12- Only a fraction of the old logger/hunter roads became surveyed and platted roads when 
the various subdivision plats were recorded. 
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13- The Strawberry plat did not show a road crossing Lots 38, 39 and 40 but showed only a 
road fronting the lots and providing access thereto. 
14- At the time of the purchase, plaintiff James R. Wilhelm and the defendant Pine Meadows, 
through its duly authorized agent Bill Pringle, walked over and inspected the two lots. 
Pringle was the selling agent in the deal with plaintiffs. Pringle acted as the selling agent 
of Pine Meadows for some 100 lots between 1968 and 1990. 
15- The evidence was inconclusive as to when the road across lots 38, 39 and 40 was first 
graded. Plaintiffs remembered it was not graded at the time of purchase. Pine Meadows' 
president said it was, but its selling agent, Pringle, thought it may not have been. The 
initial grading effort was much more narrow and conservative than later occurred. 
16- After contracting to purchase Lots 38 and 39 on June 30, 1968, but before receiving title, 
plaintiffs entered upon the property and constructed a cabin. 
17- Plaintiffs accessed their property from the platted road fronting the same. They likely 
followed an old logger/hunter road to get to the cabin site, but it was necessary to perform 
some earth work to access this old road from the platted road which had been cut along 
the mountain slope. 
18- Plaintiffs were issued warranty deeds by Pine Meadows on January 6,1972 for lot 39 and 
on September 25,1975 for lot 38. 
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19- The plat covering Ponderosa shows a road running to the rear of Strawberry Lot 38 but it 
dead-ends at the boundary between the two plats. The road on the Ponderosa plat is in 
the general area, but it is unclear from the evidence whether it is in the exact location of 
the road now claimed by defendants. 
20- The Court was furnished something akin to a master plat showing how the various 
subdivisions fit together, but this was not an official plat and was never approved nor 
recorded. It shows a road running from front to back on Strawberry Lot 38, parallel and 
adjacent to the westerly lot line. It is unclear whether this was originally shown on this 
unofficial document or drawn in at a later time. In any event, none of the parties claim 
the actual existence of a road which corresponds to this depiction, and it is clearly at 
variance with the official plat and with the unplatted road in question which cuts 
diagonally across three lots. 
21- The warranty deeds issued to plaintiffs do not contain a reservation for roadways and 
there is nothing appearing on the Strawberry plat covering Lots 38 and 39 which would 
have put plaintiffs on notice of any unplatted road or easement. 
22- Pine Meadows originally conveyed Strawberry Lot 40 to others, but has since reacquired 
title and is the current record owner thereof. 
23- During the time that it did not own Lot 40, and under date of Aug. 2,1995, Pine 
Meadows obtained an easement across Lot 40 and duly recorded the same on aug. 10, 
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1995. During this same time frame, Pine Meadows attempted to obtain an easement from 
plaintiffs on Lots 38 and 39, but plaintiffs declined. 
24- Each warranty deed from Pine Meadows to plaintiffs provided only that the conveyance 
was "Subject to: covenants, conditions, restrictions, reservations, rights of way and 
easements of record" (emphasis added). 
25- None of the defendants have ever obtained or retained an easement of record across 
Strawberry Lots 38 and 39. 
26- In conjunction with its platting and subdivision effort, Pine Meadows opened a new road 
which was duly platted and constructed and which served and continues to serve 
essentially the same purpose as had previously been served by the road which defendants 
claim crossed Lots 38, 39 and 40. 
27- Lots 3 8, 39 and 40 each had a frontage of 94.10 feet. 
28- The restrictive covenants governing Strawberry provided that "Lot sizes, as prescribed by 
the subdivision plat. . . are considered minimum lot sizes and no person shall sell, lease 
or otherwise dispose of said lot in parcels smaller than the original lot sizes...." 
29- The roadway claimed by defendants cuts diagonally across Lots 38, 39 and 40, comes 
within a few feet of plaintiffs' cabin and would, if recognized, substantially reduce the 
size of each lot. If a road were cut out of Lot 38 alone, as shown on the unofficial master 
plat or sketch, it would reduce Lot 38 by some 43%. 
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30- The Court does not find credible defendants' claim that defendants "inadvertently 
neglected" to include the disputed road on the plat or reserve a roadway easement on the 
deeds issued to plaintiffs. 
31- The Court makes no finding with respect to whether the route across Lots 38, 39 and 40 
is preferable to the newly platted route, nor does it make any finding as to whether or not 
two different accesses would be desirable. These are essentially policy issues for the 
public body not for the Court to decide. 
32- Kane County approved the various plats, and particularly Strawberry and Ponderosa, with 
access as platted and with no reference to the road in question. Any effort by the county 
to thereafter create or recognize a public road came less than ten years before plaintiffs 
permanently blocked access and did not follow any statutory procedure. 
33- During the 1970fs and into the 1980's the amount of development in the various 
subdivision plats in proximity to Lots 38 and 39 was limited, and accordingly the amount 
of vehicular traffic in the area was likewise limited. 
34- Also during the 1970fs and into the 1980fs the plaintiff James R. Wilhelm was actively 
involved in a professional career outside the state of Utah and along with his wife was 
only an infrequent visitor to the cabin they had constructed. 
35- During the 1970fs and into the 1980fs there was some use of the old road across Lots 38, 
39 and 40 by others who had constructed cabins in the general vicinity. This use, 
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however, was both limited and sporadic because there was simply not an extensive 
amount of development on the mountain at that time. 
36- During the 1970fs and 1980fs, plaintiff on several occasions undertook efforts to block 
access to the road, sometimes with logs, sometimes with vehicles and by reliance upon 
trenching undertaken by others and sometimes by personal notice. Some of plaintiffs 
blocking efforts resulted in confrontations with would-be users where plaintiffs made 
clear their opposition to continued use. 
37- Plaintiffs' blocking efforts were not exhaustive but neither was the amount of use. 
Moreover, the use appears essentially to have been made by neighbors within the 
subdivisions developed by Pine Meadows as opposed to members of the general public. 
38- By the time the 1990fs arrived, the amount of use had increased and during or about 1993 
plaintiffs responded with signs and by installing steel posts in cement with a lock chain 
blocking access. 
39- Pine Meadows' agent, Bill Pringle, was somewhat aware of plaintiffs' effort to block 
access and use over the years, and had a clear memory of the more permanent and 
extensive effort during the 1990fs. 
40- During the 1990fs, the road in question was improved and substantially widened, 
presumably by Kane County, though it was not a party to these proceedings. Defendants 
did not participate in the expansion and improvement of the road in question. 
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41 - The widening and improvement and increased use prompted a much more extensive and 
ongoing effort on the part of plaintiffs to disallow access. It is undisputed that this has 
occurred at least since 1993. 
42- Plaintiffs' efforts at blocking the road and preventing access met with resistence by 
others, including the Kane County Sheriff who cited plaintiff for blocking a public road 
sometime during 1996. The action was dismissed in the justice court for lack of evidence 
that the road was in fact a public road. 
43- The permanent type devices installed by plaintiffs to block access to the road were 
physically removed on more than one occasion. Plaintiffs continued to use the cabin only 
for recreation use and were not present when removal occurred. 
44- At no time between the time of contracting to purchase Lots 38 and 39 and the filing of 
this law suit was there a ten-year period of uninterrupted use of the disputed road by 
members of the public. 
45- Plaintiffs commenced this action on or about October 23, 1996 seeking an order closing 
the road, requiring restitution of the land and for attorney's fees. Before trial, plaintiffs 
abandoned its request for attorney's fees. 
46- Defendants counterclaimed asking the court to find and decree the existence of a public 
thoroughfare across plaintiffs' property. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
When Pine Meadows and its close circle of owners, officers and directors selected among 
the old unimproved roads those for inclusion in its formal plats, it necessarily evidenced its intent 
to abandon others not so included. The evidence is clear that, for whatever reason, defendants 
did not include as a platted road the old logger/hunter road which apparently crossed a portion of 
Lots 38, 39 and 40. Rather, defendants platted new roads, one of which serves the same purpose 
historically served by the old roadway in question. Kane County accepted the plats with the lots 
and dedicated roads as shown thereon. If the County or the defendants required additional access 
or intended some other road to be recognized, it should have been shown on the plat. It is 
untenable as a matter of law for either defendants or the County to include some old unimproved 
roads, elevating them to the status of platted roads, exclude others and then claim those excluded 
encumber lots which appear on the face of the plat to be unencumbered. The incongruence of 
such a claim is further heightened by the recordation of restrictive covenants which provide that 
each lot is at the minimum permissible size and preclude any sale or disposition otherwise. 
Moreover, Pine Meadows' conveyance by warranty deed carried with it the statutory guarantee 
of "quiet possession" and "that the premises are free from all encumbrances" and that Pine 
Meadows would "forever warrant and defend the title... against all lawful claims whatsoever". 
UCA §57-1-12. Under the facts of this case, these defendants are precluded from asserting that a 
public thoroughfare existed when the plats were recorded in 1968 and 1969 and when the deeds 
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were issued to plaintiffs in 1972 and 1975; and this is so even if the proof were sufficient to 
establish a pre-existing "public thoroughfare" which the Court concludes it is not.1 
Defendants' claim that a public thoroughfare thereafter came into existence is not 
supported by the facts. The governing statute, §72-5-104*, provides as follows: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years. 
The law in Utah is well settled that the burden of proof is on the side trying to prove dedication 
to the public. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806 (UT App 1998). This burden can 
only be met by proof which is clear and convincing. Ibid. Moreover, there is a presumption in 
favor of the property owner and his ownership is accorded a high degree of sanctity. Draper City 
v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (UT 1995). It has also been held that use by neighboring 
landowners and their personal visitors is not sufficient to prove public use. These persons cannot 
be numbered in the class of members of the general public using such road in a fashion that 
might ripen into a dedication under the road statute. Petersen v Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (UT 1968). 
The use must be such that it is a "thoroughfare" where members of the public have a general 
right of passage. Heber City Corp. v Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (UT 1997). Finally, it is generally 
1
 The Court is mindful of the stringent requirements for a public body to abandon or vacate a dedicated 
road or public thoroughfare. How that relates to the county's official acts in this case need not be resolved since the 
old unimproved roads (before platting) did not reach the status of public thoroughfares. 
2
 Before 1998 the statute was found at 27-12-89 UCA. 
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recognized that unambiguous acts by the owner which evidences an intention to exclude the 
public from uninterrupted use destroys the prescriptive right and the 10-year period must begin 
anew. Highways §27, 39 AmJur 2d, 1999 at 603. 
The evidence laid before the Court by defendants was less than "clear and convincing". 
Defendants called several persons that testified of the use over a couple of decades before being 
completely blocked out, but for the most part this was use by neighboring lot-owners, or those 
who provided services to them; and the absence of extensive development, particularly during 
the early years, limited the nature and opportunity for conflict and also reduced the occurrences 
where plaintiffs' efforts to blockade coincided with others' efforts to use. But some 
confrontations did exist, sufficient to evidence plaintiffs' intent to exclude the public from 
uninterrupted use. Furthermore, the blockade devices employed by plaintiffs, including those 
that were of a permanent nature during the 1990's, were removed when plaintiffs were not 
around. 
The County's assertion of a right on behalf of the general public does not appear to have 
arisen until near or during the 1990's. This was too little too late and was clearly and strenuously 
resisted by plaintiffs beginning in 1993. The County may have been caught off-guard by all of 
this proposed development in the late 1960's, but this does not excuse a failure to properly deal 
with access issues at the time the plats were approved. The access was as reflected on the 
recorded plat, and lot purchasers were entitled to rely thereon. More particularly, lot owners 
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were not only entitled to rely upon the existence of the platted roads, but the non-existence of 
unplatted roads later claimed by these defendants and the County in contradiction of the 
approved plats. If the County now considers the access inadequate, it can pursue such remedies 
as are authorized by law. 
All of this adds up to a failure on the part of the defendants to meet their burden of proof. 
Furthermore, defendants of all people were not in a position to advance the claim of a public 
thoroughfare. Any use by them would have been inconsistent with the continuing obligation of 
Pine Meadows under the warranty deeds and would have arisen for the benefit and purposes of 
its development and its lot owners and not for the general public. Neither Pine Meadows nor its 
officers or directors gained any right from use in violation of the express warranty. 
While the Court concludes that a public thoroughfare does not exist, it is unable to 
compel defendants to assume the responsibility for obliterating the roadway. There wasn't any 
proof that defendants were responsible for its widening and improvement. This renders moot 
defendants" argument with respect to the statute of limitations. To the extent the statute of 
limitations argument was also intended to apply to the warranties under the deeds, the argument 
is rejected. The grantor's duty to "forever warrant and defend" precludes the grantor from 
pursuing a course that would create encumbrances inconsistent with the warranty. 
Plaintiffs' claims for attorney's fees having been abandoned, the Court does not consider 
the same. Plaintiffs' are awarded costs incurred. 
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Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare a decree and judgment in conformity with the 
findings and conclusions herein entered. 
Dated this * 7 day of May, 2000. 
K.L. 
District Coui/t Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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[m] Justin W. Wayment 
Blaine T. Hofeling 
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